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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Educational Attainment. (August 2009) 
Yingning Wang, B.A., Central South University; M.A., Fudan University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Li Gan 
 
One of the very interesting demographic features in the US over the last several 
decades is the persistent racial educational gap between blacks and whites and the 
reverse gender education gap as a result of the rapid rise in women’s educational 
attainment. This dissertation is to investigate the reasons behind it. 
I first investigated the educational gap between blacks and whites. I propose a 
new model to identify if and how much the educational attainment gap between blacks 
and whites is due to the difference in their neighborhoods. In this model, individuals 
belong to two unobserved types: the endogenous type who may move in response to the 
neighborhood effect on their education; or the exogenous type who may move for 
reasons unrelated to education. The Heckman sample selection model becomes a special 
case of the current model in which the probability of one type of individuals is zero. 
Although I cannot find any significant neighborhood effect in the usual Heckman sample 
selection model, I do find heterogeneous effects in our type-consistent model. In 
particular, there is a substantial neighborhood effect for the movers who belong to the 
endogenous type. No significant effects exist for other groups. On average, I find that the 
   iv 
neighborhood variable, the percentage of high school graduates in the neighborhood, 
accounts for about 37.7% of the education gap between blacks and whites. 
This dissertation sheds some insight about women’s educational attainment by 
studying the motivations of education for women: to pursue higher wages and to find 
highly educated spouses. The identification strategy is that the college education is 
exogenous to the partner choice if education is driven by pursuing higher job market 
return (the type of marry-for-romance), and is endogenous if the education decision is 
driven by marriage market return (the type of marry-for-money). I find that the marry-
for-romance type has higher education than the other type and given everything else the 
same, with the same education level, the women who marry for money have a higher 
probability of finding a highly educated husband than those marrying for romance. 
Therefore, the reversal educational gap could be the result of more marry-for-romance 
women.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
       One of very interesting demographic features in the US over the last several decades 
is persistent racial educational gap between blacks and whites and reverse gender 
education gap as a result of rapid rise in women’s educational attainment. This 
dissertation is to investigate the reasons behind it. 
       The education gap between blacks and whites is substantial in the United States. 
According to the 2000 census, the percentage of whites graduating from high school is 
18% more than that of blacks, while the percentage of whites with bachelor degrees is 
twice as much as that of blacks. A growing literature claims that neighborhoods and peer 
groups can be important in determining education outcomes (Durlauf, 2002; Manski, 
1993). However, it remains difficult to empirically identify the neighborhood effect on 
education because individuals may move in response to the impact of the neighborhood 
on their education outcomes. Although this type of endogenous moving may have 
significant effects, it is only one of many reasons people may move. Individuals may 
choose to move for several other reasons which are independent of the neighborhood 
effect on education.  
 
         
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Human Resources. 
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       Chapter II argues that heterogeneous moving actually provides an opportunity to 
reveal individuals’ preferences about neighborhoods and to help identify the 
neighborhood effect. In particular, I suggest that there are two unobserved types of 
individuals.For one type, moving is endogenous to the education decision, while for 
another type, moving is exogenous. Although the types are unobserved, it is possible to 
assign a probability that each household belongs to one of the two types. The usual 
Heckman sample selection model becomes a special case of this model in which the 
probability of falling into one of the two types equals zero or one.  
       A specification test rejects the Heckman model and favors our type-consistent 
model. Although I cannot find any significant neighborhood effect in the usual Heckman 
sample selection model, I do find heterogeneous effects in our type-consistent model. In 
particular, there is a substantial neighborhood effect for movers who belong to the 
endogenous type. No significant effects exist for other groups. On average, I find that the 
neighborhood effect accounts for about 37.7% of the education gap between blacks and 
whites. 
       Another key demographic feature in the US over the last several decades is the rapid 
rise in women’s educational attainment. The educational gap between females and males 
has been declined or even reversed. More than half of American college students are 
women and about 60% of college graduates are females (Becker and Posner, 2008). 
       Chapter III tries to shed some insight by studying the motivations of education for 
women. An obvious return for more schooling is a higher wage in the labor market. In 
addition, the literature has provided another potential return for education: a better 
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educated person may be able to meet a better educated partner in the marriage market. 
While the benefits from the marriage market apply for both genders, it is likely more 
important for women since married man on the average have higher labor force 
participation rates and higher income than married women.  
       There is a wide literature base about the effect of education on the quality of 
partners and it finds positive assortive mating in terms of education (Boulier 1984; Mare 
1991; Cancian et al. 1993; Behrman et al. 1994; Juhn and Murphy 1997; Weiss and 
Willis 1997). Little work, however, investigates whether the mating and the education 
investment will be different if the education decisions are driven by different incentives. 
Chapter III focuses on empirically identifying the motivation of education and its effect 
on the prospect of partners. Chapter III first suggests an identification strategy to 
distinguish these two types of motivations for education. In particular, if the woman’s 
education decision is endogenous to the partner choice, then pursuing marriage market 
return is her motivation for education(i.e., the woman is the “marry-for-money” type). 
However, if the woman’s education decision is exogenous to the partner choice, then her 
education decision is driven by the labor market return (i.e., the woman is the “marry-
for-romance” type). Second, I propose and estimate an empirical model that incorporates 
these two types of motivations in the market. The central empirical challenge is how to 
identify the type, since the type is unobservable. Chapter III suggests modeling the 
unobserved types by a mixture density to characterize the unobserved types. The 
estimation results suggest that both motivations exist in the population. A woman would 
have a probability of 0.388 to be the “marry-for-money” type, and the “marry-for-
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money” type would take 0.855 years less education than the “marry-for-romance” type. 
Further, at the same education level, the “marry-for-money” type woman would be much 
more likely to have a better educated partner than the “marry-for-romance” type. Finally, 
I find that a woman’s attitude toward a female’s role in a family is the key factor that 
identifies the two types of women. A woman with a more traditional view on the 
female’s role in a family would be more likely to belong to the “marry-for-money” type. 
       This result suggests a potential reason for a recent rapid rise in women’s educational 
attainment. The changes of women’s attitude about the women’s status in the family and 
in the society are documented in the literature. With more and more women becoming 
career oriented, they are more attracted by the financial benefit from the higher 
education. Therefore marriage consideration becomes less and less important in their 
education decision. The more marry-for-romance type women the society has, the higher 
the educational attainment the women will have. 
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CHAPTER II 
RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY, NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS, AND 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF BLACKS AND WHITES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
       The education gap between blacks and whites is substantial in the United States. 
According to the 2000 census, the percentage of whites graduating from high school is 
18% more than that of blacks, while the percentage of whites with bachelor degrees is 
twice as much as that of blacks. A growing literature claims that neighborhoods and peer 
groups can be important in determining education outcomes (Durlauf, 2002; Manski, 
1993). However, it remains difficult to empirically identify the neighborhood effect on 
education because individuals may move in response to the impact of the neighborhood 
on their education outcomes. Although this type of endogenous moving may have 
significant effects, it is only one of many reasons people may move. Individuals may 
choose to move for several other reasons which are independent of the neighborhood 
effect on education.  
       This chapter argues that heterogeneous moving actually provides an opportunity to 
reveal individuals’ preferences about neighborhoods and to help identify the 
neighborhood effect. In particular, I suggest that there are two unobserved types of 
individuals. For one type, moving is endogenous to the education decision, while for 
another type, moving is exogenous. Although the types are unobserved, it is possible to 
assign a probability that each household belongs to one of the two types. The usual 
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Heckman sample selection model becomes a special case of this model in which the 
probability of falling into one of the two types equals zero or one.  
       A specification test rejects the Heckman model and favors our type-consistent 
model. Although I cannot find any significant neighborhood effect in the usual Heckman 
sample selection model, I do find heterogeneous effects in our type-consistent model. In 
particular, there is a substantial neighborhood effect for movers who belong to the 
endogenous type. No significant effects exist for other groups. On average, I find that the 
neighborhood effect accounts for about 37.7% of the education gap between blacks and 
whites. 
       The difference in returns to education between blacks and whites is often considered 
to be one of the reasons for the education gap. However, Neal and Johnson (1996) and 
O’Neil (1990) argue that the returns to education between blacks and whites have been 
converging over the last twenty years, while the education disparity has remained the 
same (Couch and Daly, 2002).  
       While the returns to education between blacks and whites have been converging 
over the past twenty years, the widespread residential segregation of blacks from whites 
in metropolitan areas remains (Cutler, Glasear and Vigdor, 1999). Segregation has 
declined in the cities but has increased in suburbia, resulting in little net change 
(Weinberg and Iceland, 2002). Wide racial segregation indicates that blacks and whites 
have different neighborhoods (Ananat, 2007). For example, the percentage of high 
school graduates in the black neighborhoods is only 59.9% of that in the white 
neighborhoods (see table A1.1-2).  
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       Neighborhood effects on educational attainment have been widely studied. Earlier 
studies such as the Coleman Report (Coleman et al., 1979) find that the socioeconomic 
composition of students has significant effects on the unequal academic attainments of 
white and black children. Crane’s (1991) test supports the existence of neighborhood 
effects by examining the pattern of neighborhood effects on dropout rates and teenage 
childbearing. Aaronson (1998) also finds neighborhood effects on high school 
graduation. However, other scholars find mixed evidence or an insignificant effect of 
neighborhoods on educational attainment (Brooks-Gunn, et al 1997; Datcher, 1982; 
Duncan, 1994; Duncan, et al. 1997; Lillard, 1993; Plotnick and Hoffman, 1999). The 
neighborhood variables in these studies include economic conditions, occupational 
composition, racial characteristics, poverty status, and demographic composition.  
       According to Ginther, Haveman and Wolfe (2000), the inconsistency of 
neighborhood effects on education actually implies that the research of neighborhood 
effects could be subject to omitted variable or selection biases. The difficulty in 
identifying neighborhood effects is well known within the literature and has thus 
received extensive attention. This difficulty arises because non-random self-selection 
generates the correlation between individual and group attributes, some of which are 
likely to be unobservable, resulting in biases in the estimation of group effects on group 
members’ behaviors. 
       One approach to solve this problem is to randomize neighborhood choice by special 
social experiments. However, results from experiments are also mixed. Early results 
from the Gautreaux program imply that outcomes for parents and children were 
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markedly better for those who moved to the less-segregated suburbs (Popkin, 
Rosenbaum and Meaden 1993). On the other hand, Kling and Votruba (2001) find that 
the placement assignments in the Gautreaux program were not entirely random. Moving 
to Opportunity (MTO) uses a randomized design and finds that randomly selected 
families who move from deprived areas to more affluent neighborhoods have less 
violent criminal behavior by teens, better health care and child care, and better mental 
and physical health. However, the difference between control groups and treatment 
groups in welfare participation, employment, and child test scores is much less than what 
is found in the Gautreaux studies (Hanratty, McLanahan and Pettit 1998; Katz, Kling 
and Liebman 2001; Ladd and Ludwig, 1997; Ludwig, Ladd, and Duncan, 2001). 
Similarly, Oreopolous (2003) and Jacob (2004) study the impact of public housing 
projects in Toronto and Chicago and find no significant differences in test scores and 
dropout rates. Finally Gibbons (2002) finds that educational attainment is slightly higher 
for those from neighborhoods with above average educated households by using data 
from contrasting council tenant housing in the United Kingdom. However, his result is 
not robust to random housing assignment.  
       The above results from social experiments suggest that the significance of 
neighborhood effects on education is sensitive to whether or not projects have random 
designs. Significant neighborhood effects on education are only found in experiments 
where housing assignment is not totally random. This implies that whether the 
residential mobility is endogenously chosen or not is strongly related with the extent of 
neighborhood effects on education.  
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       Social experiments, although very insightful, are limited in scope. Another broad 
approach is to find econometric solutions (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Manski, 1993; 
Moffitt, 2001). This approach concentrates on the endogeneity of the moving decisions 
and the neighborhood characteristics. Most recently, Ioannides and Zabel (2008) suggest 
an identification strategy by taking housing demand and neighborhood choice as joint 
decisions in the presence of neighborhood effects.  
       This chapter contributes to the econometric solution to the neighborhood effect 
problem by focusing on the endogenous selection process. I first show the heterogeneity 
in selection process for movers and non-movers. The coefficients for the inverse mills 
ratios in the Heckman sample selection model are significant for non-movers but not 
significant for movers. Therefore, I propose a new model to account for heterogeneity in 
the selection process. In this new model, individuals are assumed to belong to one of the 
two types: an endogenous type whose moving decisions and education decisions are 
jointly determined, and an exogenous type whose decisions about moving and education 
are determined independently. Because the type is unobserved, it can only be determined 
with a probability. Following the typical approach in the literature to model the 
unobserved types, I use a mixture density to characterize the unobserved types and the 
corresponding equations for schooling years. 
       Another difficulty in modeling residential mobility is that I only observe 
individuals’ final residences but no alternative choices. Ignoring this problem will lead 
to inconsistent estimation. I solve this problem by choosing the average of characteristics 
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within the group of counties that are spatially adjacent to the county where individuals 
reside as instrumental variables (Ioannides and Zanella, 2007).  
       Empirically, this chapter has two main findings. First, the chapter provides strong 
evidences of two unobserved types. The estimation in the chapter is conducted allowing 
the possibilities of either one type or two types. Clearly the two type model matches with 
the data better than the one type model. In addition, this chapter finds that people from 
different types do behave differently. The endogenous type would have taken 5.515 
years of schooling, much more than 3.687 years of schooling taken by the exogenous 
type. Overall, 82.12% of people belong to the endogenous type. 
       Second, this chapter finds a strong neighborhood effect for the people who are 
endogenous and who are movers, despite no statistically significant effects are found in 
the one-type Heckman sample selection model. This result suggests the importance of 
type consistent model. In particular, the chapter finds that if a black who belongs to the 
endogenous type moves to a white neighborhood, his education would increase by 
1.0965 years because of the neighborhood effect. Overall, the difference in the 
percentage of high school graduates can explain about 37.7% of the gap in education 
between blacks and whites. 
       These results are consistent with studies using social experiments in residential 
mobility. Public school choice lottery results (Hastings, Kane and Staiger, 2006) also 
show that the gains of students’ test scores after attending their chosen school depends 
on the weight that their parents’ preference for academic quality carries in their choices. 
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All of these suggest that there could be two selection processes and that neighborhood 
effects vary across the types. 
       The individual and household level data in this chapter comes from the National 
Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The majority of county level 
information is from NLSY79; I supplement that data with county level information 
derived from either the US Census or from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC). The key neighborhood characteristic variable used in the chapter is race-specific  
county level education.  
       The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: 2.2 is the data description. 2.3 
first estimates the Heckman sample selection model, then introduces the type-consistent 
model, and proposes a solution to the endogeneity of the neighborhood variable. 2.4 
estimates the model and presents the main empirical results of this chapter. And 2.5 
concludes chapter with a discussion of the future research.. 
2.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
       The data for the analysis are primarily from National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79), supplemented by the 5% census sample in 1980, CDC’s Compressed 
Mortality Files, the Geographic Information System (GIS) based census data, and 
residential segregation indexes from the census. The NLSY79 includes a representative 
sample of 12,686 individuals. These individuals were 14-22 years old when they were 
first interviewed in 1979, which was also the time for them to choose whether or not 
they would need to acquire post compulsory education. These individuals were 
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interviewed annually through 1994 and on a biennial basis until 2000. NLSY79 includes 
individual, family, and some county (neighborhood) characteristics data.  
A. Key variables 
       The key individual level variables in this chapter include the highest grade 
completed for an individual after compulsory schooling years and his/her moving status 
between 1979 and 1982. The individual schooling years after compulsory schooling are 
constructed by using highest grade completed minus compulsory schooling. I use school 
years beyond compulsory schooling since this represents educational attainment 
determined by the individual. I assume that in 1979 individuals make two decisions: 
years of schooling after compulsory education, and whether they want to change their 
neighborhoods or not. To exclude the residential mobility resulting from entering 
college, I restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 14 and 17. Individuals 
who drop out of school before they finish their compulsory education are also excluded 
from our sample. Keane and Wolpin (1997) use the schooling years after age 16 as a 
proxy for schooling beyond compulsory years when they study the schooling and career 
choices for young men. 
       Compulsory schooling years are derived from compulsory attendance laws and child 
labor laws. Compulsory attendance laws specify a minimum and maximum age between 
which attendance is required and the minimum period of attendance. The child labor law 
regulates the employment of minors and the minimum of age to work. Those laws differ 
across states, and child labor laws and compulsory attendance laws have different 
requirements for leaving school. Following Lleras-Muney (2005), I construct two 
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measurements for schooling years: work permit age minus entrance age, and leaving age 
minus entrance age. I choose the minimum requirement of these as our variable for 
compulsory schooling years. The years of compulsory schooling vary from six years to 
ten years. In table A1.1-1, the average additional schooling years are 5.315 for whites 
and 4.93 for blacks.   
       In the 1979, 1980, 1982 and 2000 interviews, information from individuals’ five 
most recent moves and residences was collected in NLSY79 at the county level. An 
individual is defined as a mover if his county of residence in 1979 is different from his 
county of residence in 1982; otherwise, he is defined as a non-mover. I do not have 
information on people who moved within a county. People who moved away first and 
then moved back to the same county are categorized as non-movers. In our sample, 
22.21% of whites, 16.90% of blacks, and 14.77% of other races are movers. 
       Defining the neighborhood of an individual is very difficult. This chapter uses the 
county in which the individual resides and the individual’s racial group as his 
neighborhood, because of data availability, and the substantial segregation between 
blacks and whites in metropolitan areas and counties. Since the focus of this chapter is 
the neighborhood effect on the highest grade completed, the ideal neighborhood variable 
would be average schooling years at the neighborhood level. However, data on the 
percentage of the population who finish high school and college are available only by 
county. I expect that those percentage variables are highly related to average schooling 
years. Therefore, the key neighborhood variable in this chapter is the percentage of 
population finishing high school.  
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       However, only the overall percentage of high school graduates at the county level is 
available in the NLSY. To construct race-specific high school graduates at the county 
level, I use the1980 IPUMS (Integrated Public Used Microdata Series) 5% census 
samples to construct two data series: the metropolitan level percentage of high school 
graduates (SMA) and the metropolitan level race-specific percentage of high school 
graduates (SMA /Black and SMA /White). Then I use the ratio between the metropolitan level 
race-specific percentage of high school graduates and the metropolitan level percentage 
of high school graduates (SMA /Black /SMA and SMA /White /SMA) to construct the county level 
race-specific percentage of high school graduates by using county level percentage of 
high school graduates multiplied by the above ratio. This strategy is based on the 
assumption that the ratio for the percentage of high school graduates is the same for the 
county and the metropolitan area. 
       Appendix B Figure 1 shows that there is a positive relationship between the 
individual education and the neighborhood variables, i.e., the county-level race specific 
percentages of high school graduates, for both movers and non-movers. The slope is 
larger for the mover group than for the non-mover group, suggesting that moving may 
induce a difference in the neighborhood effect. The simple regression results, listed 
below in figure 1, reveal the same relationship. The slope estimates are statistically 
significant at 0.0297 for the movers and 0.0210 for the non-movers 
       Table A1.1-2 lists the county-level overall percentages of high school graduates for 
both whites and blacks, as well as the race-specific percentages of high school graduates 
for both whites and blacks. Overall, blacks live in counties that have lower percentages 
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of high school graduates. The difference is even larger if it is race-specific, indicating 
that black neighborhoods have an even lower percentage of high school graduates.  
B. Other variables 
       Table A1.1-1 lists other individual characteristics variables, including race, gender, 
age, residence (at the county level), religion (1 if religion frequency is more than once 
per week), and feelings about the safety of school (1 if the individual feels safe). 
Variables about family background include mother and father’s education, family size, 
the oldest sibling’s highest grade completed, family income, whether or not the 
individual lived with his parents until the age of 18, and family poverty status.  
       In addition to the individual and family background, table A1.1-2 presents a set of 
county characteristics as county level control variables. These variables are referred in 
Manski (1993) as contextual variables. These variables include the race-specific 
mortality risks, obtained from the CDC. In particular, the external mortality rate for ages 
15 to 34 is used, under the assumptions that a huge disparity of mortality risks between 
black and white teenagers is due to external reasons such as homicide and that the peer 
group for teenagers is the young group with similar ages. During this time period, 
blacks’ external mortality rate is about 162 per 100,000 people, while whites’ is only 
89.2 per 100,000 people.  
       Other county characteristics variables include the percentage of blacks in the 
population, the percentage of people living in urban areas, arrest rates, employment rate 
in the education institution, and the overall unemployment rate. Table A1.1-2 lists the 
means and standard deviations for the key variables for the whole population and by 
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race. Neighborhood variables also differ significantly. Blacks also have a much higher 
crime rate; theirs is 5,833 per 100,000 people verses the white crime rate of 4,949 per 
100,000.  
       Table A1.2 presents differences in county-level variables between movers and non-
movers in 1979 (before moving) and 1982 (after moving) by race. The number in the 
table is percentage difference between movers and non-movers. For example, for the 
mortality rate, the number in column (1) is -1.1298, indicating that black movers’ county 
mortality rate is 1.1298% lower than the black non-movers county mortality rate. Since 
the number in column (2) (after they move) for mortality risk is -10.8796%, blacks move 
from counties with slightly less mortality risks to counties with significant less mortality 
risks. In summary, table A1.2 shows: (a) Before moving, compared with white non-
movers, white movers’ neighborhoods have a lower percentages of blacks, lower 
unemployment, lower education levels, lower incomes, and less crime rates; (b) 
Compared with black non-movers, before their moving, black movers used to live in 
neighborhoods with fewer blacks, lower educational levels, and less crime known to the 
police; (c) For both whites and blacks, it is not difficult to find that movers usually move 
to neighborhoods with lower external mortality rates, higher percentages of urban 
population, and higher education levels; (d) The comparison of movers’ and non-
movers’ neighborhoods before moving and after moving reflects a process of racial 
integration, at least at county level. Black movers usually move to the neighborhood 
with a lower percentage of blacks, and whites’ new neighborhoods have a higher 
percentage of blacks. Blacks’ new neighborhoods have higher income and lower 
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unemployment, but this is not the case for whites. The new neighborhoods for both races 
have more crimes known to the police.1  
C. Data imputation and sample size 
       A substantial number of county and individual variables are involved in this chapter. 
As a result, the intersection of non-missing values of all these variables is a rather small 
sample size. For example, from NLSY79, there are 4,963 individuals who are between 
the ages of 14 and 17, with positive schooling years and a non-missing record for the 
residence in 1979-1982. However, the intersection of all non-missing variables reduces 
the sample size to 918. Therefore, it is necessary to impute missing variables to preserve 
the sample size to some extent.  
       I use the mean imputation method. This method uses the mean of non-missing 
values to impute the missing values. I have three levels of variables: individual level, 
county level, and state and metropolitan level. The following imputation rule is adopted: 
(1) For the individual level data, I use race-specific national mean data to replace the 
missing data. (2) For the county level data, I use race-specific state mean data. (3) For 
the state level or metropolitan level data, I use race-specific national mean data. In 
addition to imputation, I also construct a missing dummy variable for each variable with 
missing observations. The variable takes on the value of one if an observation is missing, 
and zero otherwise. Among the total 4,963 observations, 3,686 observations remain after 
imputation. The rest of the missing values are from the variables I do not impute, most 
                                                 
1 The fact that 1982 crime rate and arrest rate are much higher than 1979 is consistent 
with the 1980’s increase in the crime rate and arrest rate.   
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of which are dummy variables. Table C1 presents the data statistics before imputation 
and after imputation.  
2.3 The model 
A. Choice of schooling years 
       Suppose that individual i is a member of group g. He (with his parents) chooses the 
schooling years Si after his compulsory schooling. Let Si be linearly related to the 
following control variables: (i) individual level characteristics Xi; (ii) group level 
variables that are predetermined at the time that choices are made, Zg; (iii) an 
individual’s perception of the average choice of others, Sg ; and (iv) unobservable 
individual and group attributes vi and ηg, which make up the error term. According to 
Manski (1993), (ii) are the contextual effects, (iii) are the endogenous effects, and (iv) 
are the correlated effects. Therefore, the basic equation of schools years can be written 
as 
   1 2 3i i g g iS X Z S v gβ β β= + + + +η .    (1.1) 
       Non-random sorting processes may create correlation between Sg and the error term 
vi. For example, those people with positive vi are likely to move to areas or 
neighborhoods with high quality schools. This may create a correlation between the 
observed group characteristics such as percentage of high school graduates enrolling in 
colleges. 
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B. Residential mobility choice 
       The residential mobility choice model in this chapter is given by  
( )11( 0) 1i o og d dg i i igmove Y Y X e z eδ δ δ δ= + + + > ≡ + i    (1.2) 
where movei is 1 if individual i’s location at 1979 is different from his location at 1982, 
and is equal to 0 otherwise. The moving decision depends on the individual 
characteristics Xi, the contextual variables in the current location Yog , and the destination 
Ydg. In this chapter, the current location, o, is the county where the individual resided in 
1979 and the destination, d, is the county where he resided in 1982.  
       Moving can be driven by a multitude of reasons: convenience, cost saving, or 
random shocks to the family or the job. This chapter investigates the relationship 
between the moving and education investment decisions; therefore, children’s welfare is 
assumed to be one of the factors the parents will consider when they choose their 
location. 
       Since I can only observe whether an individual moves and information on the origin 
and destination, and no information relating to the steps involved in search is observed, 
the estimation of the above equation for alternative location is impossible.  However, 
ignoring those alternatives may cause the estimation to be inconsistent. Following 
Ioannides and Zanella (2007), I choose the area-level characteristics of spatially adjacent 
counties as instrumental variables. There are two reasons to use these variables as 
instruments. First, if different areas are characterized by different distributions, 
Weitzman (1979) shows that the optimal search strategy is the nested strategy in which 
people search among areas first, and then search within the area. This type of search 
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strategy suggests that average characteristics of adjacent counties would be correlated 
with the own-county characteristics. Therefore, using the average characteristics of 
adjacent counties as instrumental variables would be appropriate. Moreover, even if a 
person’s search strategy is not the nested strategy of Weitzman (1979), it is still 
appropriate to use the adjacent counties as instruments as long as these instruments are 
well-correlated with the own-county characteristics, and are uncorrelated with the error 
term of the main equation. It is worth noting here that the instrumental regression does 
not require that I correctly specify the relationship between the instrumental variables 
and the endogenous variable; it only requires a correlation between these variables.  
       The construction of the instrumental variables in this chapter is slightly different 
from Ioannides and Zanella (2007). They choose the averages of the characteristics 
within the entire group of spatially adjacent census tracts, including the census tract 
where households reside as their instrumental variables. Including the location where the 
household resides could introduce some correlation between the instrument variables 
and the error term. Therefore, in calculating the spatially adjacent county means, I 
exclude the individual’s county of residence.  
C. Joint decisions of mobility and schooling 
       Here I allow the schooling decision and residential mobility to be jointly 
determined. The residential mobility decision is described in equation (1.2). The 
schooling-choice model with mobility is assumed to be the following: 
     1 2 3 4 *i i og og og ig i gS X Z S S move vβ β β β= + + + + +η .     (1.3) 
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       In equation (1.3), I allow the neighborhood effect of current location, o, to affect the 
schooling choice. Figure 1 suggests that movers and non-movers may differ in their 
responses to the neighborhood variable. This difference may arise from the fact that 
those who move are more sensitive to the neighborhood than those who do not move. 
The parameter β4 captures the differential effect of Sog. I use the 1979 Zog and Sog values 
in this equation.  
       The endogenous moving process means that unobserved factors driving individuals’ 
moving also have impacts on individual’ schooling choices. If the moving decision is 
modeled as in (1.2), then the error term ei in equation (1.2) is correlated with the error 
term vi in equation (1.3). Assuming that Corr(vi, ei) = ξ, and taking the conditional 
expectation for movers and non-movers, I have 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2 3 4| 1ig ig i og og ZE S move X Z S Zφ δβ β β β ζ δ
⎛ ⎞= = + + + + ⎜⎜ Φ⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟   (1.4.1) 
 ( ) ( )( )1 2 3| 0 1ig ig i og og ZE S move X Z S Zφ δβ β β ζ δ
⎛ ⎞−= = + + + ⎜⎜ −Φ⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟    (1.4.2) 
       Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are the Heckman sample selection model. Equation (4.1) is 
for the movers and equation (4.2) is for the non-movers. Testing the statistical 
significance of the coefficient ξ in equation (4.1) using the sub-sample of movers is a test 
for the endogeneity of the moving decision. Similarly, one can use the sub-sample of 
non-movers to test the statistical significance of the coefficient estimate of ξ in equation 
(4.2).  
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       A less well-known implication of (4.1) and (4.2), however, is that the coefficient for 
the Heckman correction term φ(zδ)/Φ(zδ) for movers is the same as the coefficient for 
the term -φ(zδ)/(1-Φ(zδ)) for non-movers. Therefore, testing the equality these two 
coefficients can serve as a specification test of the model.2
       I use the two-step Heckman method to estimate the model. In the first step, I 
estimate the residential mobility choice model described in equation (1.2). Before I 
estimate the moving probit model, I apply the Rivers and Vuong (1988) procedure to test 
the endogeneity of county variables for the original place and the destination. Table A1.6 
presents the results. As discussed earlier, consistently estimating this model requires a 
set of instrumental variables. I use adjacent counties information as the IVs. Table A1.5 
presents the estimation results from the first step with the set of instrumental variables. 
The estimated coefficients, , are used to construct the inverse mills ratio term δˆ
( ) ( )δδφ ˆ/ˆ zz Φ  for the mover sub-sample and the term ( ) ( )( )δδφ ˆ1/ˆ zz Φ−−  for the non-mover 
subsample. Table A1.3 lists the estimation results for the Heckman sample selection 
models for both movers and non-movers. For comparison purposes, the OLS results are 
also presented in table A1.3 for both movers and non-movers. 
       It is clear from table A1.3 that the coefficients between movers and non-movers are 
different, while the coefficients between the OLS and the Heckman sample selection 
model are only marginally different. It is important to point out that the coefficients for 
the neighborhood variable—the county level race-specific percentages of high school 
                                                 
2 In fact, the coefficient of Xi should also be the same for both equations. Testing the 
equality of the coefficient β can also serve as a specification test. 
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graduates—are insignificant for both the mover subsample and the non-mover 
subsample in the Heckman model. Although the coefficient is marginally significant (at 
the 10% significant level) for the non-mover subsample in OLS, the Heckman sample 
selection test rejects the OLS model for this subsample. Therefore, despite an 
unconditional positive relationship between the percentage of high school graduates and 
schooling years illustrated in figure 1, this neighborhood variable does not have any 
effect on schooling years after controlling for other variables in the Heckman sample 
selection model.   
       More important, the Heckman sample selection test exhibits inconsistent results 
from two subsamples. As discussed earlier, the coefficients from the inverse mills ratios 
should be the same for both subsamples. For the non-mover group, the coefficient 
estimate for the inverse of mills ratio is a statistically significant value of 2.046 (0.773), 
suggesting that the neighborhood choice is endogenous. However, if I use the mover 
group, the coefficient estimate for inverse mills ratio is statistically insignificant at the 
value of 0.604 (1.285), suggesting that the moving decision is exogenous. This 
difference suggests the possibility that the population may be heterogeneous in its 
motivations for moving. In the next subsection, I consider an extension of the current 
model in which the moving decisions may either be endogenous or exogenous to the 
schooling choice.  
D. A model of heterogeneous motivation in moving 
       People move for multiple reasons. For example, they may move for better economic 
prospects. Bowles (1970) finds that economic incentives affect geographic mobility of 
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workers. By estimating a dynamic model of search, Kennan and Walker (2006) conclude 
that differences in expected returns are important in driving migrations across the United 
States. Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) also make a similar conclusion. Other papers 
suggest that mobility may be driven by the individual taste and characteristics. For 
example, college-educated couples usually locate in larger cities to pursue more job 
opportunities, better quality of life, and a business environment (Chen and Rosenthal, 
2006; Costa and Kahn, 2000). There are also Schelling-type motives; i.e., white 
American families tend to move out of areas where the share of minorities is above a 
critical point (Card, Mas and Rothstein, 2007).  
       Therefore, it is possible that residential mobility can be either endogenous or 
exogenous to the schooling choice. I assume there are two types of people: one is the 
endogenous type and one is the exogenous type. Because these two types of people may 
have different preferences, it is possible that their neighborhood effects may affect their 
schooling choices differently. Consider an extension of equation (1.3):  
11 12 13 14 1*i i o o o i iS X Z S S move v oβ β β β= + + + + +η
o
  (1.5.1) 
01 02 03 04 0*i i o o o i iS X Z S S move vβ β β β= + + + + +η   (1.5.2) 
       For equations (1.5.1) and (1.5.2), the coefficients for Xi, Zo, So are allowed to be 
different to capture the possible behavioral differences for the two types of individuals. 
Without loss of generality, I let the moving decision for type 1 in equation (1.5.1) be 
endogenous, and let the moving decisions for type 0 in equation (1.5.2) be exogenous. 
Given that the moving decision is modeled in equation (1.2), I have  
    
   25 
 
Corr(v1i, ei) = ξ, and Corr(v0i, ei) = 0.    (1.6) 
       Further, suppose that an unobserved variable Ti governs individual i’s type: When Ti 
= 0, individual i is type 0 (exogenous type); when Ti = 1, individual i is type 1 
(endogenous type). Therefore, the observed education Si can be written as 
Si = (1-Ti) S0i + Ti S1i.     (1.7) 
       The type variable Ti is assumed to be determined by a vector of family and 
individual characteristics variables, denoted as wi.   
1( 0)  where (0 1)i i i iT w ~ N ,π τ τ= + >    (1.8) 
       I assume that covariance of between (v0i, τi) and (v1i, τi) is zero in this analysis. After 
plugging S0 and S1 into the Si in equation (1.3), I have the following model on schooling 
choice: 
11 01 12 02 13 03 14 04
01 02 03 04
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) *
        *
        
i i o o o
i o oi o i
i o io
S T X T Z T S T S move
X Z S S move
iβ β β β β β β β
β β β β
λ η ε
= − + − + − + −
+ + + +
+ + +
 
where λi = Tv1i+(1-T) v0i. 
       Because only type 1 individuals are assumed to engage in endogenous moving while 
type 0 individuals are assumed to move for exogenous factors, the expectations 
conditioning on types and moves are given by  
( ) ( )( | , 1) (1 )
1 ( ) ( )i i i i
z zE v move type move move
z z
φ δ φζ δδ δ
⎡ ⎤−= = − +⎢ ⎥−Φ Φ⎣ ⎦
 
( | , 0) 0i iE v move type = =  
       Since types are unobserved, the expectations conditioning on moves only are given 
by 
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1
0
( | 1) ( | 1, 1) Pr( 1| 1)
                               ( | 1, 0) Pr( 0 | 1)
i i
i
E S move E S move T T move
E S move T T move
= = = = = =
+ = = = =  
1
0
( | 0) ( | 0, 1) Pr( 1| 0)
                               ( | 0, 0) Pr( 0 | 0)
i i
i
E S move E S move T T move
E S move T T move
= = = = = =
+ = = = =  
       Therefore, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
11 12 13 14 i
01 02 03 04 i
i
( | 1) ( )
                  1 ( )
( )                          ( )
( )
i i o o
i o o
o
E S move X Z S
X Z S
z
z
β β β β ω π
β β β β ω
φ δζ ω π ηδ
⎡ ⎤= = + + + Φ⎣ ⎦
⎡+ + + + −Φ⎣
⎡ ⎤+ Φ +⎢ ⎥Φ⎣ ⎦
π⎤⎦   (1.9.1) 
( )
( )( )
11 12 13 i
01 02 03 i
i
( | 0)  ( )
                           1 ( )
- ( )                          ( )
1 ( )
i i o o
i o o
o
E S move X Z S
X Z S
z
z
β β β ω π
β β β ω π
φ δζ ω π ηδ
= = + + Φ
+ + + − Φ
⎡ ⎤+ Φ +⎢ ⎥− Φ⎣ ⎦
  (1.9.2) 
       Equations (1.9.1) and (1.9.2) together describe our type-consistent model. 
Comparing equation (1.9.1) with the Heckman sample selection model of (1.4.1), and 
(1.9.2) with equation (1.4.2), I find that our model is reduced to the Heckman model in 
two circumstances. First, if there is only one type of individuals, our model becomes the 
Heckman sample selection model. In the case that all individuals belong to the 
exogenous type, Pr(Ti=0) =1, i.e., Φ(wiπ) = 0, (1.9.1) and (1.9.2) become (1.4.1) and 
(1.4.2), respectively, without the Heckman sample correction term. In the case that all 
individuals belong to the endogenous type, Pr(Ti=1) =1, i.e., Φ(wiπ) = 1, (1.9.1) and 
(1.9.2) become (1.4.1) and (1.4.2), respectively, with the Heckman sample correction 
term. Second, when the coefficients of two types are the same; i.e., the behavior 
responses of the two types of individuals are the same, equation (1.9.1) and equation 
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(1.4.1) only differ by the probability term Φ(wiπ). This is intuitive since the model 
assumes that only part of the people belong to the endogenous type. The probability term 
Φ(wiπ) precisely gives the proportion of people who are endogenous. Estimates using 
(1.4.1) would overestimate the coefficient for the Heckman sample correction term. 
       The type-consistent model suggested in this chapter belongs to the family of the 
mixture density models. The mixture density models have been widely used in the 
literature to model unobserved types. For example, Feinstein (1990) proposes and 
estimates a mixture density that considers the unobserved violations and the observed 
detections of violations of laws and regulations. Keane and Wolpin (1997) model five 
different unobserved types in ability endowment using a mixture density model. Knittel 
and Stango (2003) estimate a mixture density model using state-mandated price ceilings 
as focal points for unobserved tacit collusions of credit card companies. When modeling 
the default probability of consumer credit cards, Gan and Mosquera (2008) suggest that 
different types of consumers may come from the heterogeneity in consumers’ time 
discount rates, and/or the heterogeneity in their risk aversion. A model with unobserved 
types would lead to better out-of-sample predictions in default probability. Identification 
of this type of model, however, depends on the assumptions of the distribution. Here I 
assume that error distributions are normal since there are no compelling reasons to 
assume any other distributions. 
       Estimation of (1.9.1) and (1.9.2) requires two steps. First, I estimate the residential 
mobility model to obtain the inverse mills ratio term. The results of this estimation are 
listed in Table A1.5. In the second step, I estimate both (1.9.1) and (1.9.2) 
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simultaneously. The parameters to be estimated include parameters from the schooling 
choice models, β, and the parameters from the type determination model, π. Nonlinear 
least squares is applied to equation (1.9.1) for movers and (1.9.2) for non-movers 
simultaneously.  
       Since the type-consistent model is highly non-linear, it useful to understand its small 
sample properties. In the Appendix D, I conduct a simulation study with sample sizes of 
100, 500, 1,000 and 3,000. It is shown that when the sample size is below 1,000, large 
biases may occur and estimates are no longer reliable. When the sample size is 1,000, 
some biases may occur and estimates must be taken with caution. The estimates are very 
close to the true values when the sample size is 3,000.  
E. Endogeneity of the neighborhood variable and its IV 
       In the education demand equation, the perceived neighborhood education variable So 
is possibly related to the error term ηo; thus, I must find appropriate instrument variables. 
The chapter uses instruments similar to those used in Ioannides and Zabel (2008): the 
county means of the inverse mills ratios. The county means of the inverse mills ratios are 
constructed from county variables and derived from the econometric assumption. 
Therefore, the county inverse mills ratio will not be correlated with unobserved county 
characteristics, and it is a valid instrumental variable (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Manski, 
1993; Moffitt, 2001).  
       Another source of instruments is the racial residential segregation indexes. These 
indexes are calculated at the metropolitan level. Residential segregation indexes usually 
measure the degree of racial segregation in terms of residence in five dimensions: 
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evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. The assumption here is 
that a black’s neighborhood would be the black population in the county where he 
resides, and a white’s neighborhood would be the white population in the county where 
he resides. However, the degrees of residential segregation may be different not only 
across the counties, but also within the counties. Therefore, our neighborhood variable 
can only be a proxy of the true neighborhood variable. In other words, our neighborhood 
variable is a measure of the true neighborhood variable with measurement errors, 
causing an endogeneity problem. To mitigate this problem, I use the segregation indexes 
as instrumental variables, which should mitigate these biases. Obviously the segregation 
indexes would be correlated with our neighborhood variable, but there is no reason to 
believe that these variables would have an effect on schooling in addition to their effect 
on the neighborhood variable. This chapter uses seven different measures of the 
segregation indexes as instrumental variables for our key neighborhood variable, the 
race-specific percentage of high school graduates. These seven measures capture all five 
dimensions of segregation. Table C2-1 describes these seven indexes in detail, and table 
C2-2 lists their summary statistics. All these indexes are directly obtained from the 
Census Bureau.  
       I use a weak identification test to test the above sets of instruments, and the Cragg-
Donald test statistic is 95.434, much larger than the Stock-Yogo weak IV test critical 
values for 5% relative bias (20.53) and 10% size (36.19). Therefore, I reject the null 
hypotheses of weak identification. Table A1.4 lists the first stage results for the 
percentage of high school graduates.  
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2.4 Estimation results 
       The estimation involves several stages. First, I estimate a probit model for the 
moving decision by using the adjacent county means as instrumental variables. Second, 
using the county mean inverse mills ratio derived from the moving estimation and 
segregation indexes as IVs for the endogenous neighborhood variable, I get the predicted 
race-specific percentage of high school graduates at county level. Third, the predicted 
county education level is used to estimate the type-consistent model. In particular, I 
simultaneously estimate the type determination equation and the neighborhood effects 
on the education equations for the two types.  
A. Residential mobility choice estimation 
       The residential mobility choice is modeled in equation (1.2). The contextual 
variables for both their current location Yog and their destination Ydg used in this chapter 
include percentage of population living in urban areas, percentage of households with a 
female as the household head, the crime level, percentage of high school graduates, 
percentage of college graduates, the unemployment rate, the total employment, and per 
capita income. All variables are at the county level. The individual and family 
background variables include the father and mother’s highest grades achieved, family 
size, age and age squared, a dummy for blacks, a dummy for male, and a dummy for 
living in an urban area. If a variable has missing values, I construct a missing dummy for 
those observations that have missing values.  
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       As discussed earlier, the contextual variables are potentially endogenous. The 
strategy is to employ the mean value of adjacent counties (excluding the county where 
the individual resides3) as instrumental variables.  
       To test the endogeneity of the contextual variables, the Rivers and Vuong (1988) 
two-stage procedure is implemented. First, I run each neighborhood characteristic 
variable on its instruments (the mean of adjacent counties) and get residuals; second, I 
run the probit model with individual variables, all the neighborhood characteristic 
variables, and all the residuals from the first stage. If the coefficients before the residuals 
are significant, then corresponding variables are endogenous; otherwise, they are 
exogenous. The second stage results are presented in table A1.6. From this table, only 
the civil unemployment rates at the origin and the destination and the per capita income 
at the origin are endogenous. Therefore, I only instrument for these three endogenous 
variables in our estimation. The estimation results are presented in Table A1.5.  
       Before I discuss the estimation results, I follow Ioannides and Zanella (2007) to 
label a variable as an “attractor” if its coefficient is negative for the current county, and 
positive for the destination county. Similar, a variable is labeled as a “repeller” if its 
coefficient is positive for the current county, and negative for the destination county. I 
expect that for the same variable the coefficients for the origin and the destination will 
have opposite signs and same absolute value. 
H1:  sgn(δo,j) = - sgn(δd,j)                for all j. 
H2:  δo,j = - δd,j         for all j. 
                                                 
3  The adjacent counties for each county are found from GIS programming and I thank 
Ms Yige Gao’s help and guide in our GIS programming. 
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       In table A1.5, I find that percentage of urban population, crime rate, percentage of 
high school graduates, percentage of college graduates, unemployment rate, and per 
capita income have significant impacts on people’s moving decision. Among the above 
variables, the percentage of urban population, the percentage of high school graduates, 
and the percentage of college graduates are all attractors in individuals’ moving decision. 
People would like to stay in places with a high percentage of urban population and a 
high education level. On the other hand, the unemployment rate acts as a repeller. People 
would like to move away from places with high unemployment rates and move to places 
with high employment rates. The estimation results show that low crime rates and high 
per capita income will increase the probability of moving out. The estimation result for 
the crime rate is consistent with the fact that movers move to the residence with high 
crime rate (see table A1.2) because of the in the huge increase in the crime rate in 
1980’s. In terms of per capita income, black movers move to the location with higher per 
capita income, while white movers do not. The estimation result for per capita income 
reflects that on the average movers move to the location with low per capita income 
because I have more whites than blacks in the sample.  
       In addition, table A1.5 also shows that the inclination of moving also differs across 
families. It is related to parents’ education background and family size. In most cases, 
moving is easier for the smaller families and for highly educated parents. The estimation 
also shows that moving usually happens more frequently before individuals are 16.6 
years older and becomes less when individuals are older than 16.6 years. Finally, there is 
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no statistically significant difference between blacks and other races in their moving 
probabilities.  
B. Results from the type-consistent model  
       In subsection 2C, I discuss the Heckman sample selection model for movers and 
non-movers and present the estimation results in table A1.3. I show that the Heckman 
sample selection model produces inconsistent results for the mover group and the non-
mover group. In this section, I estimate our type-consistent model. To be more general, I 
allow both types to be potentially endogenous. By doing this, I can test if one type is 
exogenous while another type is endogenous. In particular, I rewrite (1.6): 
Corr(v1i, ei) = ξ1, and Corr(v0i, ei) = ξ0 .    (1.10) 
       A specification test of our type-consistent model is that ξ1≠0 and ξ0 = 0. 
Alternatively, a specification test for the Heckman sample selection is that ξ1 = ξ0 = ξ. In 
addition, it is entirely possible that ξ1 ≠ ξ0, and neither one of them equals to zero. This 
suggests the existence of two endogenous types. These two types may exhibit different 
behavior in their education equations.  With this setup, equations (9.1) and (9.2) are 
modified in the following way: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
11 12 13 14 1 i
01 02 03 04 0 i
( )ˆ( | 1) ( )
( )
( )ˆ                   1 ( )
( )
i i o o
i o o
zE S move X Z S
z
zX Z S
z
φ δβ β β β ζ ω πδ
φ δβ β β β ζ ω πδ
⎡ ⎤= = + + + + Φ⎢ ⎥Φ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ + + + + −Φ⎢ ⎥Φ⎣ ⎦
    (1.11.1) 
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⎛ ⎞= = + + + Φ⎜ ⎟− Φ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ + + + − Φ⎜ ⎟− Φ⎝ ⎠
(1.11.2) 
       In both equations,  instead of SoSˆ o is used where the predicted value from the 
instrumental variable regression. As discussed earlier, the instrumental variables are 
averages of the inverse mills ratios. Since the parameters δ and π are the same for both 
equations, it is necessary to simultaneously estimate both equations (1.11.1) and 
(1.11.2). The non-linear least squares method is applied to estimate this model.  
oSˆ
       Tables A1.7-1 and A1.7-2 present the estimation results. Table A1.7-1 reports the 
type estimation results, where the basic type determination model is described in 
equation (1.8). The coefficients reported from this table are similar to those from a 
binary probit-type of model. A positive coefficient of a variable indicates a positive 
marginal effect of that variable’s contribution toward the endogenous type. Different 
from a regular binary probit model, here the types are unobserved.  
       The estimation results show that endogenous type people are more likely to be those 
who are from a larger family, who leave their parents before age 18, who are from a poor 
family, who do not feel safe about their school, and who are single. Males are more 
likely to belong to the endogenous type than females. Individuals whose eldest sibling 
does not have a high education level are more likely to be endogenous type. In addition, 
individuals whose parents are highly educated are more likely to be exogenous type. An 
interesting result here is that the race does not have a significant effect on determining 
the type of an individual.  
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       Table A1.7-2 reports the estimation results for the schooling equations for both 
types. The first row in table A1.7-2 reports the covariance between the error ei (from 
moving equation) and the error vis (from the schooling equation for type s). The 
covariance ξ1 is estimated to be -0.67 (0.38), with a p-value of 0.08, and the covariance 
ξ0 is insignificant (point estimate is 0.68, and the standard error is 0.74). This result 
suggests the existence of both the exogenous type (type 0) and the endogenous type 
(type 1).  
       The table also shows that the neighborhood effects are different for different types 
of households. The key neighborhood variable in this chapter is the race-specific 
percentage of high school graduates at the county level. The only statistically significant 
effect is for the movers who belong to the endogenous type. The coefficient estimate for 
the interaction term between percentage high school graduates and moving dummy is 
0.051 (0.014). Compared with the Heckman model in table A1.3, not only is the estimate 
in the type-consistent model statistically significantly while the estimates in Heckman 
models are not, but also the magnitude from the type-consistent is much larger than 
estimates from other models.  
       From table A1.1-2, I know that the mean difference in percentage of high graduates 
between white neighborhoods and black neighborhoods is 21.5%. Therefore, if an 
endogenous type person moves from an average black neighborhood to an average white 
neighborhood, his education level would increase by 0.051* 21.5% = 1.0965 years. For 
the exogenous type person, the proportion of high school graduates does not have any 
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significant impacts on his educational attainment. The result suggests that the 
neighborhood effect is concentrated on the movers who belong to the endogenous type.  
       Furthermore, individual, family background variables, and other county variables 
also show different impacts for different types. For the endogenous type, religion has a 
positive impact on educational attainment. Religious people will choose higher 
education levels. For the endogenous type, the percentage of blacks and the mortality 
rate also have positive impacts on educational attainment.  
       For the exogenous type, mother’s education level has a negative impact on 
children’s education. The unemployment rate has a positive impact on educational 
attainment. One plausible explanation is that the high unemployment rate will give 
individuals more incentive to study hard, since higher education lowers their risk of 
becoming unemployed. Another possible reason is the high unemployment rate makes 
finding work difficult, so people stay in school longer than they would have when 
unemployment rate was low.  
       In conclusion, the above results imply that neighborhood effects have differential 
effects on educational attainment. If the location choice is endogenous, there is a 
substantial neighborhood effect for movers. However, no statistically significant 
neighborhood effect exists if the location choice is exogenous. Furthermore, the two 
types of people behave differently. Some characteristics may affect the education choice 
for one type of people but not for the others. Given the fact that table A1.3, based on the 
Heckman selection model, shows no statistically significant neighborhood effect, it is 
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important to account for the heterogeneity. It is worth pointing out here that our 
conclusions are consistent with what social experiments have found.  
       Based on the estimation results from table A1.7, table A1.8 calculates the numbers 
of endogenous types and exogenous types for movers and non-movers. Among the 3,121 
non-movers, 81.35% (or 2,539) belong to the endogenous type. For the 565 movers, the 
percentage of belonging to the endogenous type is slightly higher, at 86.37% (or 488). 
Overall, 82.12% of the sample belongs to the endogenous type.  
       Table A1.8 lists the average years of schooling by type and moving status. Overall, 
movers have more years of schooling than non-movers. More important, the endogenous 
type has 1.83 years or 49.56% more education beyond compulsory schooling than the 
exogenous type. For the movers, the difference is even more striking. The endogenous 
type has 91.7% more schooling years than the exogenous type. This large difference in 
education between the two types is consistent with the notion that the types identify two 
distinct groups of people. 
       Table A1.9 lists the observed and predicted education level by type and race. Panel 
A has the observed schooling years while panel B presents the predicted the schooling 
years. It is clear from the table that the type-consistent model predicts schooling years at 
the mean level quite well. The largest difference is about 5.3% for the blacks who are 
exogenous type. However, the predicted standard deviations are larger than the observed 
standard deviations for all types and all races. This occurs because of the nonlinearity of 
the model.   
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       As discussed earlier, if I let endogenous black movers have whites’ neighborhood 
value where the percentage of high school graduates is 21.5 percentage points higher, 
these black movers’ education level would increase by 1.0965 years. Table A1.8 shows 
that movers account for 15.33% of population and that endogenous type accounts for 
86.37% of all movers. Therefore, the average gains if blacks have the same 
neighborhood variable would be 1.0965*86.37%*15.33% = 0.1452 years, which is 
37.7% of the overall difference at 0.385 years between blacks and whites in sample. 
Therefore, I conclude that the neighborhood effect accounts for 37.7% of the overall 
education difference between blacks and whites. 
2.5 Conclusions 
       This chapter makes three main contributions to the neighborhood effect literature. 
First, it contributes to the econometric solution to the neighborhood effect by proposing 
a new model to identify the neighborhood effect. The key feature of the proposed model 
is its treatment of the unobserved types. The chapter presents two reasons to justify its 
assumption of unobserved types. The first reason is more theoretical. The chapter argues 
that people move for different reasons. One reason is to search for neighborhoods that 
may help education. In this case, the moving decision is endogenous. However, it is also 
typical for people to move for reasons that are independent to education choice. In this 
case, the moving decision is potentially exogenous. The second reason is empirical. The 
test based on Heckman sample selection model shows that coefficients for inverse mills 
ratio are different between the mover group and the non-mover group.  
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       Second, this chapter provides strong evidences of the existence of the two 
unobserved types. The estimation is conducted by allowing possibilities of both the one-
type model and the two-type model. The data supports the two-type model. In addition, 
people from different types exhibit different behaviors. The endogenous type has 91.7% 
more schooling years (beyond the compulsory schooling) than the exogenous type. 
       Third, introducing the two unobserved types of individuals helps us to identify the 
neighborhood effect. When I use the Heckman sample selection model, I do not find any 
statistically significant neighborhood effects. However, the type-consistent model shows 
that the neighborhood effect only shows up for the endogenous mover group. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the effect is not seen for the population with one-type model. I 
find that neighborhood difference between blacks and whites is an important factor 
affecting their educational gap. In particular, I find that the county-level race specific 
percentage of high school graduates can explain 37.7% of education difference between 
blacks and whites. 
       One of the limitations of this chapter is the definition of neighborhood. This chapter 
uses the county as the neighborhood. It is almost certain that such a definition of the 
neighborhood is too large. If I were able to use a sufficiently narrower geographic 
definition (census tract or zip code, or perhaps some information about individuals’ 
social circle), it is possible that magnitude of neighborhood effects would be larger. 
Here, still because of the limited information I have, I cannot make a formal comparison 
by using different definitions of neighborhood. However, it is likely that our results 
provide lower bounds of the true neighborhood effect. 
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CHAPTER III 
MARRY FOR MONEY OR MARRY FOR ROMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF FEMALES’ CHOICES OF EDUCATION AND PARTNERS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
       One of the key demographic features in the US over the last several decades is the 
rapid rise in women’s educational attainment. The educational gap between females and 
males has been declining or even reversed. More than half of American college students 
are women and about 60% of college graduates are females (Becker and Posner, 2008).  
       This chapter tries to shed some insight by studying the motivations of women for 
education. An obvious return for more schooling is a higher wage in the labor market. In 
addition, the literature has provided another potential return for education: a better 
educated person may be able to meet a better partner in the marriage market. While the 
benefits from the marriage market apply for both genders, it is likely more important for 
women since married men on the average have higher labor force participation rates and 
higher income than married women.  
       There is a wide literature base about the effect of education on the quality of 
partners and it finds positive assortive mating in terms of education (Boulier 1984; Mare 
1991; Cancian et al.1993; Behrman et al. 1994; Juhn and Murphy 1997; Weiss and 
Willis 1997). Little work, however, investigates whether the mating and the education 
investment will be different if the education decisions are driven by different incentives. 
   41 
 
This chapter focuses on empirically identifying the motivation of education and its effect 
on the prospect of partners. The chapter first suggests an identification strategy to 
distinguish these two types of motivations for education. In particular, if the woman’s 
education decision is endogenous to the partner choice, then pursuing marriage market 
return is her motivation for education ( i.e., the woman is the “marry-for-money” type). 
However, if the woman’s education decision is exogenous to the partner choice, then her 
education decision is driven by the labor market return (i.e., the woman is the “marry-
for-romance” type). Second, this chapter proposes and estimates an empirical model that 
incorporates these two types of motivations in the market. The central empirical 
challenge is how to identify the type, since the type is unobservable. The chapter 
suggests modeling the unobserved types by a mixture density to characterize the 
unobserved types. The estimation results suggest that both motivations exist in the 
population. A woman would have a probability of 0.388 to be the “marry-for-money” 
type, and the “marry-for-money” type would take 0.855 years less education than the 
“marry-for-romance” type. Further, at the same education level, the “marry-for-money” 
type woman would be much more likely to have a better educated partner than the 
“marry-for-romance” type. Finally, I find that a woman’s attitude toward a female’s role 
in a family is the key factor that identifies the two types of women. A woman with a 
more traditional view on the female’s role in a family would be more likely to belong to 
the “marry-for-money” type. 
       This result suggests a potential reason for a recent rapid rise in women’s educational 
attainment. The changes of women’s attitude about the women’s status in the family and 
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in the society are documented in the literature. With more and more women becoming 
career-oriented, they are more attracted by the financial benefit from the higher 
education. Therefore marriage consideration becomes less and less important in their 
education decision. The more marry-for-romance type women the society has, the higher 
the educational attainment the women will have. 
3.2 Literature review 
       This chapter sits at the juncture of three strands in economics literature. The first 
strand is on school’s positive impacts on the marriage outcomes. Women’s education 
can influence the marriage outcomes in the following aspects: the first is the husbands’ 
income. Highly-educated wives can become their husbands’ assistants in their jobs, or 
they can maintain their husbands’ physical and mental health and contribute to a high 
quality lifestyle (Benham 1974). Empirically, it is found the wife’s education level has 
positive impacts on husband’s earnings. The magnitudes of the impacts differ across the 
countries and regions (the marginal effects of female education on husband’s earnings 
range from 2%-5%).4 In addition, people have found that the wife’s education would 
help her to have a husband with a higher level of education. By examining how the 
educational attainment of identical twins correlates to the educational attainment of their 
spouses, Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1994) and Behrman and Rosenzweig 
(2002) found that an individual who receives an extra year of schooling relative to his or 
her twin marries a spouse with 0.3 years of additional education on average. Schwartz 
                                                 
4 Wong (1986) for Hong Kong; Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (1991) for Israel; 
Scully (1979) for Tehran, Iran; Benham (1974), Lam and Schoeni (1994) and Jepsen 
(2005) for Brazil and United States.  
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and Mare (2005) report trends in educational assortive marriage from 1940 to 2003 and 
they find that well-educated people, especially college graduates, are more likely to 
marry each other than those with less education. The marriage between persons at the 
extreme distribution of education declined. Therefore, schooling has become a more and 
more important channel to enhance the prospect of marriage. The third marriage 
outcome that education has an impact on is the probability of being single. The ratio of 
the probability of remaining single for skilled (college and above) relative to less skilled 
(less than college graduates) women has had a dramatic decline over time. Compared 
with the cohort born in 1890, the probability of being single for the generation who was 
born in 1950 and attended college around 1970 dropped from 31% to 7.9% if the women 
graduated from the college. And the probability of being single for non-college 
counterparts dropped from 7.8% to 5.5% (Fernández and Fogli 2002).   
       The second strand of literature related to this work investigates how the type of 
matching influences the investment efficiency, allocation efficiency and welfare. Booth 
and Coles (2005) assume that there are two matching paradigms: one where partners 
marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to 
productivity or debt. They found that different types of matching generate different 
investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the economy. Marrying for 
money generates greater investment efficiency; romantic matching generates greater 
allocation efficiency. Furthermore, it is shown that when people marry for money, the 
equilibrium implies the perfect positive assortive matching. It implies that when women 
marry for money, their educational attainment will help them to find highly educated 
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husbands. It is also shown that in romantic matching, where the matching is orthogonal 
to real economic variables, female education rate is lower than that of marry-for- money 
matching. When such different matching regimes arise, it suggests that if the education 
is provided by the state rather than by parents, or capital markets are perfect and young 
adults finance their own college education, children become more independent from 
their parents, then the society will end up with more romantic matching.  
       The third strand of the literature related to this chapter is the mixture density models 
that have been used in literature to model unobserved types. For example, Feinstein 
(1990) proposes and estimates a mixture density that considers the unobserved violations 
and the observed detections of violations of laws and regulations. Keane and Wolpin 
(1997) model five different unobserved types in the ability endowment using a mixture 
density model. Knittel and Stango (2003) estimate a mixture density model using state-
mandated price ceilings as focal points for unobserved tacit collusions of credit card 
companies. When modeling the default probability of consumer credit cards, Gan and 
Mosquera (2008) suggest that different types of consumers may come from the 
heterogeneity in consumers’ time discount rates, and/or in their risk aversion. A model 
with unobserved types would lead to better out-of-sample predictions in default 
probability. The identification of this type of model, however, depends on the 
assumptions of the distribution.  
       Compared with the above literature, this chapter has the following features: First, 
this chapter investigates the effect of wives’ education on their husbands’ education 
levels. A good husband can be reflected in many aspects: the personality, the wealth 
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level, the education level, and talents. The education level is generally a good signal. A 
well-educated husband usually has a good job or career and therefore good financial 
prospects. Also the education is generally helpful for developing and shaping healthy 
and harmonious personality and talents. In a conclusion, the education level can be an 
index reflecting the husband’s comprehensive ability. When considering whether the 
women’s education decision is partly driven by their marriage incentive, it can be the 
decision to go to high school, or the decision to go to college. Here the decision of going 
to college is considered, because having some college education can make larger 
difference in mating. I use NLSY1979 data and divide the whole female sample into two 
groups: one group with their highest grades less than or equal to 12 years and the other 
group with the highest grades more than 12 years. I find that the relationship between the 
husband’s education level and the wife’s education level is not linear and the 
relationship is different for two groups. Figure 2 in Appendix B graphically presents this 
relationship. For females whose education level is less than 12 years, an additional year 
of education will make their husbands’ education level increase by 0.476 year. For 
females whose education level is more than 12 years, an additional year of education 
will make their husbands’ education level increase by 0.582 year. This nonlinear and 
positive relationship between the wife’s education level and the husband’s education 
level implies that college education can enhance the probability of finding a highly 
educated husband. 
       Second, instead of assuming that the marriage consideration is one of motivations 
behind all women’s education decision, this chapter allows that some women have 
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different considerations in which their education investment is orthogonal to the 
marriage consideration. This chapter empirically analyzes the women’s education 
decision and the marriage prospect under more general assumptions. Third, by assuming 
people could have or could not have the marriage consideration, this chapter suggests the 
existence of two types of women: one is those with the marriage consideration and the 
other is those without it. However, as the type is not observable, this chapter applies the 
mixture density model to identify different types by assuming that the unobserved type 
follows the normal distribution.  
       The remainder of the chapter is organized as the following: section 3.3 develops the 
empirical models; Section3.4 presents the data set used in this chapter. Results are 
presented in section 3.5 and section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.3 Empirical models 
       To address the female’s education investment decision and the marriage prospect, 
two behavioral processes are considered: attending college or not and the educational 
prospect of the mate. I first discuss each of the two processes separately and then discuss 
them in a joint framework. 
A. Decision to attend college 
       The college decision is modeled as following: 
0 11( 0)College Zθ θ λ= + + >      (2.1) 
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where Z is the vector of observed factors that may affect the decision of going to college 
including individual level and county level characteristics. And λ is the unobserved 
random variable, which is assumed to have a standard normal distribution.  
       Empirically, College = 1 if the highest grade > 12, and 0 otherwise. Z may include 
mother’s highest grade, father’s highest grade, living in an urban area or not, poverty 
status, and county level unemployment rate. Parents’ education levels are expected to 
help children to pursue a higher education. Females from an urban area and rich families 
usually end up with a higher education.  
B. The partner’s education level 
       In this chapter, good husbands are measured by their education level. When the 
husbands’ education levels are much higher than their wives’, it reflects not only that 
husbands’ potential income or wealth will be much higher than their wives’ but also the 
husbands’ comprehensive abilities are relatively higher. Here the education level of the 
mate, although potentially continuous, is modeled as a discrete choice as well. In 
particular, if a woman’s husband has a college degree, or he has six more years of 
education, the women’s husband is considered to be a good husband, and the variable 
Marriage = 1. Otherwise, Marriage = 0. For those highly educated women (whose 
education level is also college or beyond college), as long as their husbands go to 
college, I also claim that they marry good husbands because I assume the lifetime 
income level will not have much difference for the people whose education level is 
college and beyond college. 
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0 1 21( 0)Marriage X educβ β β ζ= + + + >      (2.2) 
where the variable educ is the females’ education level. And X is the set of control 
variables that affect the women’s decision to select a highly-educated husband or a 
poorly-educated husband. The unobserved random error ζ is assumed to have the 
standard normal distribution.   
       The right-hand side of the equation includes the wife’s characteristics at the time of 
marriage: wife is from an urban area or not (1 is from the urban), education level of the 
wife’s mother, poverty status of the wife family’s and wife’s age. “educ” is wife’s 
education level at the time of marriage.  
       According to the previous discussion, the wife’s education level is helpful for her to 
find a good husband. Additionally, if the wife’s parents have high education, it is good 
for her to marry a good husband too. Also a wife from an urban area will have more 
chances to meet highly educated men.  
C. Type 
       I assume there are two types of matching. If a female’s decision about education 
investment is related to her marriage decision, then her matching type is “marry for 
money” or strategic matching, which means at least part of her education investment is 
driven by the marriage market return. Empirically, this assumption is equivalent to Cov( 
λ, ζ) ≠0, and the educ variable is endogenous in the marriage equation (2.2). However, if 
a female’s decisions about her education and marriage are independent of each other, 
which means her education decision is not driven by her marriage market return, then 
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her matching type is “marry for romance” or romantic matching. In the empirical model, 
the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneities in each equation is zero. And 
zero correlation means “marry for romance”. Furthermore, in this model specification, I 
also allow that different type people can have different behaviors. 
       As discussed before, given different motivations behind the college education 
decision, female could be divided into two types. One type is the “marry for money” 
type. Their education investment decision is partly driven by their motive to marry a 
highly educated husband. Their pursuing high education is to increase their opportunities 
to match with men with higher education. Another type is the “marry for romance” type. 
Those females’ education decisions to go to college have nothing to do with their 
marriage considerations. It is possible that different incentives will lead to different 
marriage prospects. Consider an extension of equation (2.1) and (2.2):  
0 1 21( 0)t t t tMarriage X educβ β β ζ= + + + >                   (2.3) 
0 11( 0)t t tCollege Zθ θ λ= + + >                             (2.4) 
where the type variable  0,1t =
       Coefficients in the equation (2.3) and (2.4) are allowed to vary across the types to 
capture the possible behavior differences for the two types of women. Without losing 
generality, it is assumed to be the type of marrying for romance if t=0 and the type of 
marrying for money if t=1. 
       For the type 1 who marries for money, the unobserved heterogeneity components 
from the education and the marriage are correlated, while for the type 0 who marries for 
romance, the heterogeneity components are independent. Therefore, the heterogeneity 
   50 
 
components are assumed to have the following linear relationship for the type marrying 
for money:  
                   1 1 vζ ρλ= + , where 2~ (0,1v N )ρ−  and 0ρ ≠            (2.5) 
If a female marries for romance, then  
0 1
~ ,
0 1
N
λ
ζ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
       Furthermore, suppose that an unobserved variable Ti governs the individual i’s type: 
When Ti = 0, the individual i is the type 0 (marry-for-romance type); when Ti = 1, the 
individual i is the type 1 (marry-for-money type). The type variable Ti is assumed to be 
determined by a vector of family and individual characteristic variables, denoted as wi.   
1( )iT w iπ τ= + , where ~ (0,1)i Nτ        (2.6) 
       Because the type is not observed, this model belongs to the family of the mixture 
density models. The mixture density models have been widely used in the literature to 
model unobserved types. The identification is based on the assumption of distribution. 
Here τi is assumed to follow normal distribution. 
D. Estimation 
       The estimation in this chapter will be based on the maximum likelihood function. 
According to the values of College and Marriage, four cases have to be considered:  
(1) Marriage =1 & College =0;(2) Marriage =0 & College =0; (3) Marriage =0 & 
College =1 and (4) Marriage =1 & College =1.  
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       After deriving all of joint densities for the above cases, the likelihood function can 
be written as (details are presented in Appendix E): 
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
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       In this model, the very important null hypothesis is the existence of two types of 
women i.e. ρ≠0.  If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then it gives us a strong evidence 
of the existence of two types of women. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then it means 
that all the women belong to only one type: either marrying for money or marrying for 
romance. 
3.4 Data 
       The data for the analysis are primarily from National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth 
1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79 includes representative sample of 12,686 individuals. 
These individuals were 14-22 years old when they are first interviewed in 1979. These 
individuals were interviewed annually through 1994 and were interviewed on a biennial 
basis until 2000. NLSY79 includes the individual, family, and county characteristics 
data. It is a good data set for this research because they gathered information in an event 
history format, in which dates are collected for the beginning and ending of important 
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life events such as education, employment, and marriage. The NLSY79 contains three 
sub-samples: a cross-sectional sample of representative of the civilian U.S. youth 
population; a supplemental sample of over-sample civilian Hispanic, black, and 
economically disadvantaged non-black/non-Hispanic U.S. youth; and a sample of the 
population ages 17–21 who were enlisted in the military. Following the 1984 interview, 
the military subsample was no longer eligible for interviews. Therefore I exclude the 
military subsample from my analysis. 
       Table A2.1 contains the summary statistics for observations used in the analysis. In 
the model, only the first marriage is considered. Since the information about wife’s 
marital status for each survey year is available, the year of the first marriage can be 
identified. Therefore, females’ highest grades, the residence being urban or not, the 
poverty status and the age when they got married can be identified after knowing the 
year of their first marriage. According to Table A2.1, the average age for the first 
marriage is around 23 years old and the average highest grade when getting married is 
12.7. Only around 10% of females are from the families under poverty and 77% of 
women were living in an urban area when they entered into their first marriage.   
       College is a dependent variable in the education decision. It is a dummy variable. If 
a women’s highest grade is greater than 12, which means she at least has some college 
education experience, and then the value of College is 1, otherwise it is 0. Table A2.1 
shows that less than 50% of females have the college education experience.  
       Marriage is also a dummy variable. It reflects the comparison of the husband’s 
education level and the wife’s education level. If the value of Marriage is 1, then it 
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represents that the husband’s education level is at least 6 years higher than the wife’s 
education level or her husband has at least a college education. If none of the above 
conditions are satisfied, then the value of Marriage is 0, which means the husband’s 
education is not high. In the sample, only around 37% women find highly educated 
husbands. 
       Table A2.2 presents the distribution of going to college and finding a good husband. 
Around 42% of husbands’ education level is not much higher than their wives’ or they 
do not have college education. About 29% of college-educated women marry college-
educated men. 8% of women who do not have a college education marry a highly-
educated husband. There are around 20% of women whose husband’s education level is 
less than theirs.  
       In NLSY79, the respondents were asked a few questions related to the female’s 
attitude towards women’s status in the family and career. One of the questions is: 
“It is much better for everyone concerned if the man is the achiever outside the home 
and the women takes care of the home and family.” And there are four categories of 
answers: 1 strongly disagrees, 2 disagree, 3 agree and 4 strongly agree. The variable --
traditional attitude to the women’s status is 1 if the answer is agree or strongly agree, 
otherwise it is 0. Around 36% of women’s attitude about the roles of husband and wife is 
still traditional. Other questions are related to whether a man should share the 
housework, whether women are happier in traditional roles, whether wife’s employment 
leads to more juvenile delinquency, and whether a working woman feels more useful 
than the one who does not hold a job. The answers to those questions are strongly related 
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to women’s attitude about the roles of husband and wife. However, the answer to the 
first question can best represent the female’s attitude about the marriage.  
       Other variables, such as the parents’ highest grade, the unemployment rate in the 
county where the women reside, the region of their residence and whether they lived 
with their parents at age 14 are included in the analysis. Those variables are expected to 
have some impacts on the females’ education decision and the marriage quality. Parents’ 
education level is supposed to have positive impacts on their child’s education and 
marriage prospect. On the average, parents finish the compulsory education and the 
highest grade is between 10 and 11. More than one-fourth of women are from north-
central and more than one-third of women are from south and less than one-fourth of 
women are from north east and west.      
       Dummy variable “religious” is constructed as: if a woman attended the religious 
service at least once a week, then she is considered to be religious and the value for this 
variable is 1, otherwise it is 0. In the sample, around 36% of women are religious. 
3.5 Results 
       First, equation (2.3) and (2.4) are estimated separately. Table A2.3 and A2.4 present 
the probit estimation results for equation (2.3) and (2.4). All of the estimations use the 
standardized value i.e all of variables are standardized by their own standard deviation. 
As we can see, parents’ education has a positive impact on the female’s education and 
the marginal effect is 0.0842 for mom’s education and 0.128 for dad’s education. The 
urban residence is also helpful for women to pursue college education and its marginal 
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effect is 0.057. Family poverty status and county level unemployment rate have expected 
signs for women’s college education but they are insignificant.  
       The estimation results for the marriage equation show that mom’s education is 
helpful for women to find a good husband. If mom’s education increases one standard 
deviation, their daughter’s possibility of finding a good husband will increase by 0.0458. 
Urban residence has similar impacts on women’s marriage prospect but with a little bit 
larger marginal effect at the value of 0.0623. As what expected, female’s education level 
has comparatively large positive marginal effects on the possibility of finding a highly 
educated husband. The marginal effect is 0.232. It confirms the positive assortive mating 
between the husband’s education and the wife’s education. The result that women’s age 
of getting married is positively related with the possibility of finding a well-educated 
husband is consistent with the fact that women’s age of the first marriage increases. 
       Table A2.5 reports the estimation results if only marrying for money type exists. 
Column 3 is the MLE estimation result and column 4 is the probit results for 
comparison. First, if we ignore the type of marrying for romance and assume the whole 
group has only one type, i.e. the type of marrying for money, the estimated correlation 
between error terms from equation (2.3) and (2.4) is 0.33 and it is statistically 
significant. Comparing with the probit estimation for the education equation only, the 
estimation results from MLE are marginally similar, but the MLE results for the 
marriage equation is quite different from the probit results. For the education equation, 
mother’s highest education and the urban residence also have positive impacts on their 
daughter’s decision of going to college but with a slightly larger magnitude. The 
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estimated coefficients for mom’s education and the urban residence are 0.227 and 0.151; 
while the effects are only 0.211 and 0.143 if both equations are estimated independently. 
On the other hand, if women are the type of marrying for money, the effect of dad’ 
highest education on their daughter’s education is 0.3, a little bit smaller than 0.32 in the 
independent probit estimation. 
       For the marriage equation, the estimation results are much larger than the results 
from the probit estimation except for the women’s age. When the correlation between 
these two equations is considered, the women’s age of getting married is not significant 
any more. The estimated coefficient before mother’s education is 0.257 for the MLE but 
only 0.125 for the probit model. Female’s highest grade when getting married is much 
larger for the type of marrying for money with the value of 0.72 but only 0.63 for the 
probit model. It suggests that with marriage consideration, the female’s education has 
larger marginal effects on the probability of finding a good husband, and therefore the 
positive assortive mating could be different for different types.  
       Table A2.6 reports the estimation results for the type model. First, the estimated 
value for λ is 0.32 and statistically significant. This value is quite close to the estimated 
value of 0.33 from the table A2.5. It gives a strong evidence of the existence of two 
types of women: the type of marrying for money and the type of marrying for romance. 
The positive sign of the variable suggests that any unobserved variable with positive 
impacts on the education will also have positive influence in finding a good husband. 
Second, it is worth noting that two types of women have different behaviors. The 
estimations for both the education equation and the marriage equation are quite different 
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for two types. It means that different incentives will result in different marriage 
prospects and different education investment behaviors. Parents’ education has a much 
larger effect on the daughter’s education for the type of marrying for money than that for 
the type of marrying for romance. And mother’s education plays a larger role for their 
daughter’s marriage prospect if their daughters marry for money. These results imply 
that parents have a much stronger influence on the type of marrying for money. 
Comparing the results in table A2.5, it is not difficult to find out that the estimation 
results in table A2.5 are smaller than the estimation results for marrying for money, but 
larger than the results for marrying for romance. The Urban residence has positive 
impacts on women’s education and also is helpful for women to find a good husband. 
The magnitudes of the estimations of the urban residence for both types and in both 
equations are not quite different. But the impact of the women’s education level on the 
marriage prospect is quite different for two types. For the type of marrying for money, 
the women’s education will largely enhance their probability of finding a highly 
educated husband. It will be also helpful for the women who marry for romance to find a 
college-educated husband, while the marginal effect is much smaller than that for the 
type of marrying for money. This result suggests that different types have different 
assortive matchings. The type of marrying for money has much larger positive assortive 
mating than the other type. Even for two women with the same education background 
and even everything else is the same, but if they have different incentives in their 
education investment decisions, their marriage prospects could be different. The women 
who marrying for money will have a higher probability to find a highly educated 
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husband than the women who marrying for romance, given they have the same 
education level. Also it is worth noting that the estimation value of the women’s 
education in table A2.5 is smaller than that in the type model for the type of marrying for 
money and larger than that in the type model for the type of marrying for romance.  
       But what characteristics can be used to identify the type? Theoretically, according to 
my knowledge, there is no such a theory to help me to identify the motivation behind the 
female’s education investment decision. In the chapter, it is assumed that the 
determination of the type is correlated with the women’s attitude about the marriage, 
whether they are religious or where they are from.   
       Table A2.7 reports the type determination results. I include the region variable, the 
family background variable and the women’s attitude to the women’s role in the family 
in the model. It turns out that the women’s attitude about the female’s role in the family 
is the key variable to determine the women’s type. The results suggest that women with 
a traditional attitude about the women’s role in the family are more likely to be the type 
of marrying for money, i.e. their education investment is at least partly driven by their 
marriage prospects. The women who think it is a better arrangement if women take care 
of the family usually value the family more than the career and their marriage prospect is 
more likely to be an important consideration behind their education investment. The 
variable whether females stay with their parents at the age 14 has a positive but 
insignificant estimate in the type equation. It suggests that the females who are more 
dependent on their parents have a higher probability to be the type of marrying for 
money. Other variables do not have significant impacts on the determination of the type.  
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       Based on the estimation results from table A2.7, table A2.8 reports the distribution 
of women’s education level. Panel A lists women’s average schooling years when 
getting married by the type and the husband-education status. Overall, the type of 
marrying for romance has more years of schooling than that of the type of marrying for 
money. The average education for the marry-for-money type is 12.2 years, while it is 
13.1 years for the type of marry-for-romance. This result is contrary to what Booth and 
Coles (2005) found. According to the results from the type determination, the marry-for-
money type women usually have the traditional attitude about the women’s status in the 
marriage. There is a high probability for them to stay home after getting married. Then it 
is costly for them to make too much investment on education. However, on the average, 
the education level for the type of marry for money is still above 12 years, which implies 
most of women who marry for money just have the college education experience, but 
most of they do not finish the college education. And it is also worth noting that women 
who marry a good husband on the average have higher education than those who do not 
regardless of the type.  
       Panel A also reports the observation number for each type. Among the 2,342 
women, 61% (or 1,431) belong to the marrying for romance type and 39% (or 911) 
belong to the marrying for money type. Among the type of marrying for romance, 40% 
of them find good husbands and among the type of marrying for money, 32% of them 
find good husbands.  
       Panel B presents women’s average schooling years at the time of marriage across 
the type and their attitude about the marriage. As we can see, the women with the 
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traditional attitude about the marriage have less education than those with non-traditional 
attitude. Because the attitude about the marriage is the most significant factor to 
determine the women’s type, it is not surprising that the type of marrying for romance 
has lower education than the type of marrying for money. Panel B also has the 
information of the number of observations. Almost 82% of non-traditional women are 
the type of marrying for romance, and around 76% of traditional women are the type of 
marrying for money.  
       Panel C is the distribution of the education across the marriage results and the 
attitude. Around 41% of the women who do not have the traditional attitude about the 
marriage find a good husband, while only around 31% of traditional women find a good 
husband. From Panel C and D, we can see that 54% of non-traditional women go to 
college, while only 41% of them find good husbands. Among the traditional women, 
about 40% of them go to college and 31% of them find good husbands. Also among the 
traditional women, 60% of them do not go to school and 69% of them do not find good 
husbands. Among non-traditional women, 46% of them do not have college education 
and 59% of them do not find highly-educated husbands. 
3.6 Conclusion 
       To explain the rapid increase in the women’s educational attainment, this chapter 
investigates two main motivations of investing the education. One is the marriage market 
return, the other is the job market return. Different motivations behind the educational 
investment could result in different investment behaviors and marriage prospects. 
According to different motivations, this chapter assumes that there are two types of 
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women: one is the type of marrying for money whose education investment is at least 
partly driven by their marriage market return, and the other is the type of marrying for 
romance whose education investment has no marriage considerations. The results give 
strong evidences of the existence of the two types of women. It also shows that the 
positive assortive mating in the education is more significant for the type of marrying for 
money than that for the type of marrying for romance. It implies that different incentives 
for the education will results in the different assortive mating in the education. Also this 
chapter finds that although the education will help the type of marrying for money more 
in finding good husbands, on the average their educational attainment is lower than the 
type of marrying for romance. Furthermore, this chapter also finds that the women’s 
attitude about the women’s status in the marriage is the main factor to determine their 
motivation for education. A woman with more traditional ideas about the women’s status 
in the marriage is more likely to go to college to find a good husband. In the last several 
decades, the women’s socioeconomic status has been greatly improved. More and more 
women get out pursuing their own career. Such a radical change in the women’s status in 
the marriage leads to more marry-for-romance type women and therefore a rapid 
increase in the women’s education attainment.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
       This dissertation makes three main contributions to the neighborhood effect 
literature. First, it contributes to the econometric solution to the neighborhood effect by 
proposing a new model to identify the neighborhood effect. The key feature of the 
proposed model is its treatment of the unobserved types. The dissertation presents two 
reasons to justify its assumption of unobserved types. The first reason is more 
theoretical. The dissertation argues that people move for different reasons. One reason is 
to search for neighborhoods that may help education. In this case, the moving decision is 
endogenous. However, it is also typical for people to move for reasons that are 
independent to education choice. In this case, the moving decision is potentially 
exogenous. The second reason is empirical. The test based on Heckman sample selection 
model shows that coefficients for inverse mills ratio are different between the mover 
group and the non-mover group.  
       Second, this dissertation provides strong evidences of the existence of the two 
unobserved types. The estimation is conducted by allowing possibilities of both the one-
type model and the two-type model. The data supports the two-type model. In addition, 
people from different types exhibit different behaviors. The endogenous type has 91.7% 
more schooling years (beyond the compulsory schooling) than the exogenous type. 
       Third, introducing the two unobserved types of individuals helps us to identify the 
neighborhood effect. When I use the Heckman sample selection model, I do not find any 
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statistically significant neighborhood effects. However, the type-consistent model shows 
that the neighborhood effect only shows up for the endogenous mover group. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the effect is not seen for the population with one-type model. I 
find that neighborhood difference between blacks and whites is an important factor 
affecting their educational gap. In particular, I find that the county-level race specific 
percentage of high school graduates can explain 37.7% of education difference between 
blacks and whites. 
       To explain the rapid increase in the women’s educational attainment, this chapter 
investigates two main motivations of investing the education. One is the marriage market 
return, the other is the job market return. Different motivations behind the educational 
investment could result in different investment behaviors and marriage prospects. 
According to different motivations, this chapter assumes that there are two types of 
women: one is the type of marrying for money whose education investment is at least 
partly driven by their marriage market return, and the other is the type of marrying for 
romance whose education investment has no marriage considerations. The results give 
strong evidences of the existence of the two types of women. It also shows that the 
positive assortive mating in the education is more significant for the type of marrying for 
money than that for the type of marrying for romance. It implies that different incentives 
for the education will results in the different assortive mating in the education. Also this 
chapter finds that although the education will help the type of marrying for money more 
in finding good husbands, on the average their educational attainment is lower than the 
type of marrying for romance. Furthermore, this chapter also finds that the women’s 
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attitude about the women’s status in the marriage is the main factor to determine their 
motivation for education. A woman with more traditional ideas about the women’s status 
in the marriage is more likely to go to college to find a good husband. In the last several 
decades, the women’s socioeconomic status has been greatly improved. More and more 
women get out pursuing their own career. Such a radical change in the women’s status in 
the marriage leads to more marry-for-romance type women and therefore a rapid 
increase in the women’s education attainment.   
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1.1-1 Data description---individual variables 
Variables White Black All 
Schooling years beyond compulsory schooling 5.3149  4.9301  5.1880  
  (2.7780) (2.3929)  (2.6755)  
Move dummy (1 if moved in 1979 and 1982) 0.1682  0.1244  0.1533  
  (0.3741) (0.3302)  (0.3603)  
Age 15.61  15.60  15.60  
  (1.06)  (1.06)  (1.06)  
Mom highest grade (total years of education) 10.92  10.75  10.73  
  (3.08)  (2.46)  (3.05)  
Dad highest grade (total years of education) 11.23  10.23  10.83  
  (3.66)  (2.90) (3.54)  
The oldest sibling's highest grade 11.85  11.81  11.81  
  (2.52)  (3.08)  (3.01)  
Family size 4.96  5.62  5.19  
  (1.78)  (2.31)  (2.01)  
Family income (in $) 18,671  10,876  16,087  
  (12,243) (8,585)  (11,665)  
Safe feeling about the school (1 if feel safe) 0.5924  0.5368  0.5724  
  (0.4915) (0.4989)  (0.4948)  
Religion Degree 0.4039  0.4201  0.4102  
  (0.4908) (0.4938)  (0.4919)  
Urban (1 if living in urban) 0.74  0.7856  0.7653  
  (0.44370) (0.4106)  (0.4239)  
Family poverty (1 if in poverty) 0.2239  0.5005  0.3125  
  (0.4169) (0.5002)  (0.4636)  
Living with parents until age 18 (1 if yes) 0.6270  0.4584  0.5754  
  (0.4837) (0.4985)  (0.4943) 
Multi move in 1979 and 1982 (1 if yes) 0.0707  0.0507  0.0638  
  (0.2564) (0.2195)  (0.2443)  
Living with parents at age 14 (1 if yes) 0.7217  0.4469  0.6381  
  (0.4483) (0.4974)  (0.4806)  
Married (1 if never married) 0.9825  0.9971  0.9872  
  (0.1311) (0.0535)  (0.1122)  
Black (1 if black) 0 1 0.2835  
  0 0 (0.4508)  
Male (1 if male) 0.4835  0.5005  0.4891  
  (0.4998) (0.5002)  (0.5000)  
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Table A1.1-2 Data description---county-level variables 
Variables White Black All 
Percentage high school graduates 51.01  45.15  49.39  
  (10.68)  (10.97)  (10.97)  
Percentage high school graduates (race 
specific) 53.68  32.13  46.21  
  (11.36)  (10.61)  (15.33)  
Crime rate (per 100,000) 4,949  5,833  5395  
  (3154)  (3769)  (3693)  
Mortality rate (per 100,000) 89.21  161.98  109.78  
  (69.00)  (150.34)  (105.50)  
Percentage employed in the education 
institution 7.97  7.33  7.82  
  (2.70)  (1.78)  (2.53)  
Per capita income (in $) 4,362  4,293  4,345  
  (873)  (954)  (896)  
Percentage of population is black 8.900  25.40  13.67  
  (10.05)  (14.24)  (13.55)  
Civil unemployment rate 4.51  4.63  4.61  
  (1.75)  (1.92)  (1.82)  
Percentage of population being urban  69.29  74.07  71.41  
  (27.60)  (29.67)  (28.06)  
Number of observations 2,461 1,045 3,686 
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 Table A1.2 Percentage difference between movers and non-movers 
  Blacks Whites 
  Before move 
After 
move 
Before 
move 
After 
move 
  % diff % diff % diff % diff 
Mortality rate -1.1298 -10.8796 2.3601  -6.7735 
Percentage employed rate in 
education 2.8601 27.8552 3.6462  25.5653 
Per capita income -1.9702 0.7241 -0.5589  -0.7654 
Percentage of black -2.3586 -16.0754 -8.4888  -3.5056 
Crime rate -4.1961 -0.0259 -5.6378  3.7392 
Percentage of high school 
graduates -0.9830 9.3583 0.4812  3.4753 
Percentage of urban -6.8416 -1.2992 -6.4887  -2.2933 
Civil unemployment rate 2.3718 -9.4775 -1.4453  -0.9936 
Note: (1) Because 1982 data are not available in IPUMS, I could not impute 
county level race-specific percentage of high school graduates here. 
(2) A negative number in the table indicates that the county variable for movers is 
less than that for the non-movers. 
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Table A1.3 OLS and Heckman estimation for movers and non-movers
  Movers Non-Movers 
Variables OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
Religion degree 1.0080*** 1.0170*** 0.6000*** 0.5900***
 (0.2350) (0.2350) (0.0851) (0.0850) 
Family poverty -1.3220*** -1.2890*** -0.7700 -0.8030***
 (0.2860) (0.2850) (0.0966) (0.0966) 
Mother highest grade 0.2860*** 0.2950*** 0.1920*** 0.1930***
 (0.0394) (0.0395) (0.0148) (0.0148) 
Predicted percentage high 
school  0.0080  0.0080   0.0104
* 0.0080   
graduates(race specific) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Mortality rate 0.0012  0.0012  0.0003  -0.0001 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Crime rate -4.30e-05 -4.33e-05 -4.93e-06 -7.23e-06 
 (3.43e-05) (3.40e-05) (1.54e-05) (1.55e-05) 
Civil unemployment rate 0.091  0.102  0.209*** 0.222***
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.026) (0.026) 
Percentage employed in 
education 0.035  0.028  0.033  0.022  
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.020) (0.020) 
Percentage of being 
urban 0.007  0.008  0.002  0.003  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Percentage of being black .0219* .0213* 0.008** 0.009**
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
Per capita income 0.0003  0.0003  8.17e-05 4.85e-05 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (8.72e-05) (8.77e-05) 
Constant (0.3790) (0.4120) 0.6550  0.867**
 (1.0850) (1.0850) (0.4170) (0.4190) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.6040   2.0460***
  (1.2850)  (0.7730) 
Observations 604  615  3398  3467  
R2 0.2090  .0.2090 0.1290  .0.1292 
Note: (1) The estimation includes dummy variables for missing values of imputed  
variables. 
 (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.4 IV Estimation for the county high school graduates 
Variables Coefficient Std Err 
County mean inverse mills ratio -0.7217*** 0.2511 
Absolute Centralization Index (ACE) -9.6376 6.7710 
Absolute Clustering Index (ACL) -25.6396*** 5.6340 
Atkinson Index with b=#1 (A1) -11.7859 19.4012 
Entropy Index (H) 87.1056*** 19.4236 
Gini Index (G) -44.6909*** 9.8105 
Relative Centralization Index (RCE) 5.3356 5.2515 
Relative Concentration Index (RCO) -13.1328** 5.2579 
Inverse mills ratio 0.8593*** 0.2883 
Religion degree -0.5298** 0.2536 
Family poverty -0.0986 0.4005 
Mom highest grade 0.3348*** 0.0709 
Mortality rate 0.0026 0.0029 
Crime rate -0.0002 0.0001 
Civil unemployment rate 0.3859 0.3149 
Employment in education institution 1.0655*** 0.1803 
Percentage being urban 0.0744*** 0.0258 
Percentage being black -0.1806*** 0.0417 
Per capita income 0.0080*** 0.0008 
Constant 2.7008 4.4166 
Observations 4100 
R2 0.851 
Note: (1) The estimation includes dummy variables for missing values of imputed 
variables. 
(2) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.5 Results for IV probit for the moving decision 
  Variables IV Probit Std 
Err 
Mom’s highest grade 0.0311*** 0.0108 
Dad’s highest grade 0.0193** 0.0088 
Family size -0.0436*** 0.0133 
Age 2.8030*** 0.8050 
Age squared -0.0844*** 0.0257 
Black (1 if black) -0.0975 0.0659 
Male (1 if male) -0.0442 0.0488 
Individual 
variables 
Urban ( 1 if living in Urban) -0.0162 0.1210 
Percentage urban  0.025*** 0.005 
Percentage female head 0.021  0.031 
Crime rate 6.81e-05*** 2.45e-
05 
Percentage high school graduates 0.0550*** 0.0120 
Percentage college graduates 0.0888*** 0.014 
Civil unemployment rate* -0.353*** 0.137 
Civil employment -1.32e-07 1.57e-
07 
The destination 
Per capita income -0.0013*** 0.0004 
Percentage urban  -0.026*** 0.006 
Percentage female head -0.034 0.035 
Crime rate -5.28e-05** 2.45e-
05 
Percentage high school graduates -0.0610*** 0.0130 
Percentage college graduates -0.028 0.017 
Civil unemployment rate* 0.354*** 0.135 
Civil employment -1.32e-06 1.57e-
06 
The origin 
Per capita income* 0.0013*** 0.0004 
 Constant -24.5800*** 6.29 
Observations   4,817  
Note: (1) This is the estimation results for the equation (2) in the paper. 
 (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (3) Variables with superscript * are endogenous and the predicted values used here.  
 (4) Instrument variables for those variables are the mean values of adjacent counties  
  excluding the residence  
 (5) The estimation also includes dummy variables for missing values of imputed 
variables. 
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Table A1.6 Second stage results for Rivers and Vuong procedure 
  Variables Estimation 
Error for percentage urban -9.13E-06 
 (0.0016) 
Error for percentage female head -0.0024 
 (0.0111) 
Error for the crime rate -1.01e-05 
 (0.0001) 
Error for percentage high school graduates 0.0028 
 (0.0035) 
Error for percentage college graduates -0.0097 
 (0.0091) 
Error for unemployment rate 0.0198**
 (0.0098) 
Error for civil employment -9.72E-07 
 -6.81E-07 
Error for per capita income 0.0003  
Destination 
 -0.0003  
Error for percentage urban 0.0020  
 -0.0019  
Error for percentage female head 0.0100  
 -0.0112  
Error for the crime rate -7.06E-05 
 -9.25E-05 
Error for percentage high school graduates 0.0027  
 -0.0034  
Error for percentage college graduates 0.0142  
 -0.0099  
Error for unemployment rate -0.0168*
 -0.0091  
Error for civil employment 4.78E-07 
 -8.07E-07 
Error for per capita income -0.0006**
Origin 
  -0.0003  
Note: (1) This procedure is to justify the endogeneity of variables in the equation (2). 
(2) Only the estimations for the error terms presented here 
(3) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.7-1 Type consistent model regression results for type determination 
Variables Coefficient Std Err 
Constant -0.3448  2.0360 
Family size 0.0266** 0.0111 
Living with parents until age 18 -0.0510* 0.0289 
Black (1 if black) 0.0097  0.0431 
Mom highest grade -0.0517** 0.0233 
Male (1 if male) 0.1449** 0.0597 
Urban (1 if living in urban) 0.1121  0.0858 
Move multiple times (1 yes) -0.0339  0.0384 
Family poverty -0.0175  0.0991 
the oldest sibling highest grade -0.0335** 0.0133 
Dad highest grade -0.0297*** 0.0111 
Living with parents at age 14(1 yes) -0.0125  0.0252 
Married (1 if never married) -0.1944* 0.1182 
Family income (in US $) -5.55E-06**
2.48E-
06 
Age 0.1864  0.2671 
Age squared -0.0063  0.0086 
Feel safe about the school (1 if yes) -0.1228*** 0.0426 
Note: (1) The estimation includes dummy variables for missing values of imputed 
variables. 
(2) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.7-2 Type consistent model regression results for school equation 
  Exogenous Endogenous
Variables Coefficient Coefficient. 
zeta 0.6825  -0.6661*
  (0.7439)  (0.3801) 
Predicted percentage high school graduates (race 
specific) -0.0480  0.0290  
  (0.0370)  (0.0240)  
Predicted percentage high school graduates (race 
specific)*move -0.0470  0.0510
***
  (0.0360)  (0.0140)  
Religion degree -0.0661  0.8676***
  (0.4753)  (0.2720)  
Family poverty -0.1886  -0.2219  
  (0.5301)  (0.6509)  
Mom highest grade -0.5071** 0.1798  
  (0.2359)  (0.1162)  
Mortality rate -0.0022  0.0056***
  (0.0027)  (0.0019)  
Crime rate -4.58E-05 2.94E-05 
  8.77E-05 5.51E-05 
Civil Unemployment rate 0.249** 0.116  
  (0.111)  (0.100)  
Employment in education institution 0.189  -0.043  
  (0.117)  (0.076)  
Percentage urban 0.003  0.013  
  (0.014)  (0.010)  
Percentage black -0.025  0.033*
  (0.027)  (0.018)  
Per capita income 0.0007  -0.0003  
  (0.0005)  (0.0003)  
Constant 1.0830  4.0591*
  (2.0362)  (2.3273)  
Note: (1) The estimation includes dummy variables for missing values of imputed 
variables. 
(2) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A1.8 Education level across the type and the move 
Type Non-movers Movers Total 
5.3226  6.5143  5.5147  Endogenous type (2.5099)  (2.9996) (2.6314)  
# Observations 2,539 488 3027 
3.7234  3.4156  3.6874  Exogenous type  (2.3382)  (2.3971) (2.3454)  
# Observations 582 77 659 
5.0244  6.0920  5.1880  Total  (2.5555)  (3.1106) (2.6755)  
# Observations 3121 565 3686 
Note: the number in the bracket is the standard deviation 
 
 
 
Table A1.9 Observed and predicated education level by type and race 
Type White Black Other Total 
Panel A: Observed schooling years 
5.6370  5.2437  5.6989  5.5285  Endogenous type  (1.3295) (1.0738) (1.1049)  (1.2689)  
3.5012  3.5511  4.2751  3.6241  Exogenous type  (0.9679) (1.2166) (0.9010)  (0.9658)  
5.3150  4.9262  4.9712  5.1880  
Total  
(1.4920) (1.2308) (1.2310)  (1.4218)  
Panel B: Predicted schooling years 
5.6311  5.2026  5.7614  5.5147  Endogenous type  (2.7203) (2.3735) (2.6261)  (2.6314)  
3.5337  3.7500  4.1739  3.6874  Exogenous type  (2.4051) (2.1059) (2.5316)  (2.3454)  
5.3149  4.9301  4.9500  5.1880  Total  (2.7780) (2.3929) (2.6913)  (2.6755)  
Note: the number in the bracket is the standard deviation 
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Table A2.1 Data description 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Father's highest grade 10.86635 3.956468 0 20
Mother's highest grade 10.88471 3.1707 0 19
Family poverty status 0.230572 0.421289 0 1
Urban or not (1 is from urban) 0.757899 0.428447 0 1
Unemployment rate by county 2.568745 0.740144 1 5
Age when getting married 23.50769 4.222727 15 41
Live with parents at age 14 0.775833 0.417122 0 1
Religious (1 is yes) 0.364646 0.481433 0 1
Tradition attitude to the women’s 
status (1 is yes) 0.362084 0.480706 0 1
Living in the north east 0.166951 0.373012 0 1
Living in the north central 0.274125 0.446167 0 1
Living in the south 0.373185 0.483754 0 1
Wife's highest grade when married 12.72417 2.389087 0 20
Wife's family poverty status when 
married 0.102904 0.303898 0 1
Wife's residence is urban or not when 
married (1 is urban) 0.771136 0.420191 0 1
Educ (1 if going to college) 0.490606 0.500019 0 1
Marriage ( 1 if husband's education 
level is relatively high) 0.374466 0.484088 0 1
Observations 2342       
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Table A2.2 Marriage prospect distribution across female’s education level 
College\Marriage 0 1 Total 
0 1,002 191 1,193 
1 463 686 1,149 
Total 1,465 877 2,342 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.3 Probit estimation for college equation 
Variables Probit (Marginal effects 
reported) 
Probit 
Mother’s highest education 0.0842*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0369) 
Dad’s highest education 0.128*** 0.320*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0370) 
Residence is urban or not 0.0570*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0277) 
Family poverty status -0.0181 -0.0454 
 (0.0112) (0.0281) 
Unemployment rate -0.00288 -0.00721 
 (0.0109) (0.0274) 
Observations 2342 2342 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) All of the variables are standardized 
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Table A2.4 Probit estimation for marriage equation 
Variables Probit (Marginal effects reported) Probit 
Female’s highest grade when 
married 
0.232*** 0.632*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0429) 
Mother’s highest education 0.0458*** 0.125*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0343) 
Residence is urban or not when 
married 
0.0623*** 0.170*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0315) 
Family poverty status when 
married 
-0.00214 -0.00582 
 (0.0125) (0.0341) 
Female’s age when married 0.334*** 0.909*** 
 (0.0993) (0.271) 
Female’s age squared -0.289*** -0.786*** 
 (0.0960) (0.262) 
Observations 2342 2342 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) All of variables are standardized 
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Table A2.5 Estimation results for the type of marrying for money only 
  Variables MLE Probit 
 Mother’s highest education 0.226724*** 0.211***
  (0.025638) (0.0369) 
 Dad’s highest education 0.298634*** 0.320***
College  (0.032926) (0.0370) 
Equation Residence is urban or not 0.151182*** 0.143***
  (0.021869) (0.0277) 
 Family poverty status -0.0469 -0.0454 
  (0.026353) (0.0281) 
 Unemployment rate -0.02399 -0.00721 
   (0.016099) (0.0274) 
 
Female’s highest grade when 
married 0.718869*** 
0.632***
  (0.253956) (0.0429) 
 Mother’s highest education 0.256588*** 0.125***
  (0.070498) (0.0343) 
Marriage 
Residence is urban or not when 
married 0.248346*** 
0.170***
Equation  (0.081112) (0.0315) 
 
Family poverty status when 
married -0.02236 
-0.00582 
  (0.047996) (0.0341) 
 Female’s age when married 0.438431 0.909***
  (0.395786) (0.271) 
 
Female’s age squared 
-0.28368 
-
0.786***
  (0.393775) (0.262) 
 Lambda 0.329833*** 
   (0.032087) 
   Observations 2342 2342 
 Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) All of variables are standardized 
 
 
 
   87 
 
 
 
Table A2.6 Estimation results for the type model 
    Marry for money Marry for romance 
  Variables estimates estimates 
 constant -1.60085*** 0.541267 
  (0.044134) (0.318006) 
 
Mother’s highest 
education 1.32763*** 0.20695*** 
  (0.01734) (0.074773) 
 Dad’s highest education 1.68447*** 0.079347 
College  (0.001578) (0.112578) 
Equation Residence is urban or not -0.06736 0.264757 
  (0.333753) (0.195194) 
 Family poverty status 0.00464 -0.10232** 
  (0.33552) (0.054679) 
 Unemployment rate -0.25579*** 0.121511 
  (0.005847) (0.17848) 
  constant -0.0303 -0.2499 
  (0.282709) (0.064054) 
 
Female’s highest grade 
when married 1.394834*** 0.319246*** 
  (0.149968) (0.132329) 
 
Mother’s highest 
education 0.200312 0.003884 
  (0.948854) (0.072968) 
Marriage 
Residence is urban or not 
when married 0.047217 0.551781 
Equation  (0.393309) (0.160666) 
 
Family poverty status 
when married -0.01961 -0.01443 
  (0.288581) (0.161984) 
 
Female’s age when 
married 0.314433* 0.569898 
  (0.22338) (0.382333) 
 Female’s age squared -0.23397 -0.46441 
  (0.474527) (0.355544) 
  sigma 0.321755***  
    (0.0328623)  
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) All of variables are standardized 
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Table A2.7 Type model estimation 
Variables Estimates 
constant -0.0821 
 (0.3684) 
Living with parents at age 14 0.0171 
 (0.1070) 
Religious -0.2123 
 (0.1992) 
Tradition attitude to the women’s status 0.2819***
 (0.0884) 
Living in the north east -0.0881 
 (0.1386) 
Living in the north central 0.1719 
 (0.2184) 
Living in the south -0.0933 
  (0.1705) 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2.8 the distribution of Women’s education level when getting married 
Panel A 
Type\Marriage   0 1 Total 
Women’s education level 12.03077 14.53584 13.0566
Marry for romance #observation 845 586 1431
Women’s education level 11.5 13.6976 12.20198
Marry for money #observation 620 291 911
Women’s education level 11.80614 14.2577 12.72417
Total  #observation 1465 877 2342
Panel B 
Type\Attitude to the 
marriage   0 1 Total 
Women's education level  13.125 12.65217 13.0566
Marry for romance #observation 1224 207 1431
Women's education level  12.61852 12.02652 12.20198
Mary for money #observation 270 641 911
Women's education level  13.03347 12.17925 12.72417
Total #observation 1494 848 2342
Panel C 
Marriage\Attitude to 
the marriage   0 1 Total 
Women's education level  12.0703 11.40652 11.80614
0 #observation 882 583 877
Women's education level  14.42157 13.87925 14.2577
1 #observation 612 265 877
Women's education level  13.03347 12.17925 12.72417
Total #observation 1494 848 2342
Panel D  
College\Attitude to 
the marriage   0 1 Total 
Women's education level  11.33139 10.86024 11.130760 #observation 685 508 1193
Women's education level  14.47466 14.15 14.378591 #observation 809 340 1149
Women's education level  13.03347 12.17925 12.72417Total 
#observation 1494 848 2342
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OLS results: Dependent variable: individuals’ schooling years 
    
Variable Non-movers Movers 
Constant 4.0547*** 4.3448***
 (0.1333) (0.3197) 
% high school graduates 0.0210*** 0.0297***
(race-specific) (0.0027) (0.0064) 
Observations 3,643 926 
R2 0.016 0.023 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 1: The relationship between the individual schooling years 
and the county-level race-specific percentages of highs school graduates 
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Variables Wife’s highest grade>12 Wife’s highest grade<=12
Wife’s highest grade 0.582*** 0.476*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0288) 
Constant 5.198*** 6.553*** 
 (0.430) (0.332) 
Observations 1995 2459 
R-squared 0.176 0.100 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 2: The relationship between the wife’s education and husband’s education 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C1 Data statistics before and after imputation comparison 
  Before After 
Variables Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Mom highest grade 5128 10.8181  5451 10.8120  
   (3.0866)   (2.9985)  
Dad highest grade 4631 10.9581  5448 10.9032  
   (3.8101)   (3.5286)  
The oldest sibling's highest grade 3945 11.8063  5446 11.8251  
   (3.1702)   (2.6991)  
Family size 5454 5.1459  5454 5.1459  
   (1.9937)   (1.9937)  
Family income 4498 16095.06  5444 16107.60  
   (12371.00)   (11326.28)  
Safe feeling about the school (1 if 
feel safe) 4982 0.6200  5451 0.5667  
   (0.4854)   (0.4956)  
Crime rate 5444 5419.8330  5444 5419.8330  
   (3786.1470)  (3786.1470)  
Mortality rate 4979 107.0678  5383 109.8763  
   (103.1462)   (103.0561)  
employment in the education 
institution 5408 7.8425  5408 7.8425  
   (2.5455)   (2.5455)  
per capita income 5452 4396.2320  5452 4396.2320  
   (903.9928)   (903.9928)  
%black 5452 13.4507  5452 13.4507  
   (13.9422)   (13.9422)  
civil unemployment rate 5452 4.5879  5452 4.5879  
   (1.7735)   (1.7735)  
%urban  5452 71.9662  5452 71.9662  
    (28.2481)    (28.2481)  
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Table C2-1 Segregation indexes definition 
Variable 
Dimension 
of 
Segregation 
Explanation 
Absolute 
Centralization 
Index (ACE) 
measures of 
centralization
Examines only the distribution of the minority group 
around the center and varies between -1.0 and 1.0. 
Positive values indicate a tendency for minority group 
members to reside close to the city center, while 
negative values indicate a tendency to live in outlying 
areas. A score of 0 means that a group has a uniform 
distribution throughout the metropolitan area 
Relative 
Centralization 
Index (RCE) 
measures of 
centralization
The relative share of the minority population that would 
have to change their area of residence to match the 
centralization of the majority. The index varies between 
-1.0 and 1.0 with positive values indicating that 
minority members are located closer to the center than 
majority, and negative values the reverse. An index of 
0.0 indicates that the two groups have the same spatial 
distribution around the center 
Absolute 
Clustering 
Index (ACL) 
measures of 
clustering 
Expresses the average number of minority members in 
nearby area units as a proportion of the total population 
in those nearby area units, where distances between area 
units are measured from their centroids. It varies from 
0.0 to 1.0 
Atkinson Index 
with b=#1 (A1) 
measurement 
of inequality 
The Atkinson index allows the researcher to 
differentially weight area units at different points along 
the Lorenz curve. The shape parameters 0.1 means 
minorities are "underrepresented" and this area units 
will contribute more to segregation index 
Entropy Index 
(H) 
measurement 
of evenness 
Measures the weighted average deviation of each area 
unit from the metropolitan area's "entropy" or racial and 
ethnic diversity. It varies between 0.0 (when all areas 
have the same composition as the entire metropolitan 
area) and 1.0 (when all areas contain one group only). 
Gini Index (G) measurement of evenness 
Derived from the Lorenz curve, and varies between 0.0 
and 1.0, with 1.0 indicating maximum segregation 
Relative 
Concentration 
Index (RCO) 
measurement 
of similarly 
Takes account of the distribution of the majority group 
as well. This measure varies from -1.0 to 1.0. A score of 
0.0 means that the minority and majority groups are 
equally concentrated. An index of -1.0 means that the 
concentration of the majority exceeds that of the 
minority to the maximum extent, and an index of 1.0 
the reverse. 
Source: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.html 
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Table C2-2 Segregation indexes statistics 
Variables Statistics 
Absolute Centralization Index (ACE) 0.2549  
 (0.3692)  
Absolute Clustering Index (ACL) 0.1263  
 (0.2013)  
Atkinson Index with b=0.1 (A1) 0.0728  
 (0.1164)  
Entropy Index (H) 0.1697  
 (0.2573)  
Gini Index (G) 0.2771  
 (0.4009)  
Relative Centralization Index (RCE) 0.1090  
 (0.1877)  
Relative Concentration Index (RCO) 0.2178  
 (0.3394)  
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APPENDIX D  
 This appendix studies the small sample properties of the type-consistent model 
using simulated samples. In the simulation, the parameter values are given as following: 
 (1) The main behavior equations for the two different types are given by: 
0 typeif      * 0.24 6.012.05.0
1 typeif      * 34.0 26.05.03.0
0221
1221
=+−+−=
=+++−=
iiiiii
iiiiii
umxxxy
umxxxy  
(2) The dummy variable mi is governed by 
( )0032.003.015.001.01.0 1 4321 >+−+++−= iiiiii vxxxxm . 
(3) The yi equation and the dummy mi equation have the following relationship: 
6.0),cov(,0),cov( 10 == iiii vuvu  
(4) Type T is determined by: )01.1003.0( 1 1 >++= iii zT ε . 
The variables used in the simulation are independently drawn with following 
distribution:  
))64.01(,0(~  );1,0(~u  );1,0(~u  );1,0(~   );1,0(~ 2i1i0ii −NNNNNvi ωε , and 
 )1,0(~,,,,,, 1104321 Nzyyxxxx
I are mainly interested in the estimation bias under different sample sizes. In the 
simulation, I consider four different sample sizes: 3,000, 1,000, 500, and 100. For each 
sample size, I simulate a sample according to above setup and estimate both the 
Heckman model and the type-consistent model. The difference between the estimated 
coefficients and the true values is the bias. This process is repeated 500 times for each 
sample size. Table D1 reports the average biases from the 500 processes.  
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In this table, it is clear that coefficient estimates using the Heckman sample 
selection models have large biases, regardless if the mi = 1 sub-sample or the mi = 0 sub-
sample is used, and regardless of the sample size. This is not surprising since the data is 
simulated according to the type-consistent model. For the type-consistent model, 
coefficient estimates are very close to the true values when the sample size is 3,000. 
When the sample size is 1,000, the largest bias is 38.9% of the true value, occurring at 
β01 (true value is -0.12, bias is .0467). The bias for the parameter γ11 is 13.7% (true value 
is 0.26, bias is 0.0355). The biases for all other parameters are lower than 5% of the true 
values. Therefore, one has to be cautious when the sample size is around 1,000.  
When sample size is 500, the bias is rather large for some coefficients. For example, 
for β01, the bias is 185.5% of the true value (the true value is -.12, while the bias is 
.2226). For γ11, the bias is 65.0% of the true value (bias is 0.1691 while the true value is 
.26). Therefore, using the type-consistent model when sample size is 500 is problematic. 
When sample size is 100, estimates are clearly no longer reliable.  
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Table D1-1 Small sample bias of the type-consistent model  
   Heckman Model Type-consistent 
 True  Sub-sample mi = 0 
Sub-
sample 
mi = 1 
Model 
Coef value  Obs Bias Bias Bias  
β11 -0.5 100 -0.3890 -0.3747 0.3254 
γ11 0.26 100 0.4734  0.6299 
γ11+γ12 0.6 100  -0.2616 0.0276 
θ 0.6 100 -0.3615 -0.2616 0.0082 
β1 0.3 100 -0.4213 1.4392 0.1877 
β01 -0.12 100 1.5460 1.6054 1.3851 
γ01 0.6 100 -0.3615  0.2625 
γ01+γ22 0.36 100  0.2306 0.1120 
β0 0.5 100 -0.6528 0.4635 0.0945 
β11 -0.5 500 -0.3751 -0.3594 0.0472 
γ11 0.26 500 0.5744  0.1691 
γ11+γ12 0.6 500  -0.2362 0.0498 
θ 0.6 500 -0.3178 -0.2362 0.0021 
β1 0.3 500 -0.0752 0.7036 0.0553 
β01 -0.12 500 1.6039 1.6691 0.2226 
γ01 0.6 500 -0.3178  0.0588 
γ01+γ22 0.36 500  0.2731 0.0636 
β0 0.5 500 -0.4451 0.0222 0.0376 
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Table D1-2 Small sample bias of the type-consistent model 
   Heckman Model Type-consistent 
 True  Sub-sample mi = 0 
Sub-
sample 
mi = 1 
Model 
Coef value  Obs Bias Bias Bias  
β11 -0.5 1000 -0.3834 -0.3894 0.0164 
γ11 0.26 1000 0.5996  0.0355 
γ11+γ12 0.6 1000  -0.2175 0.0032 
θ 0.6 1000 -0.3069 -0.2175 0.0045 
β1 0.3 1000 -0.1095 0.7190 0.0086 
β01 -0.12 1000 1.5692 1.5441 0.0467 
γ01 0.6 1000 -0.3069  0.0087 
γ01+γ22 0.36 1000  0.3042 0.0150 
β0 0.5 1000 -0.4657 0.0314 0.0098 
β11 -0.5 3000 -0.3821 -0.3761 0.0033 
γ11 0.26 3000 0.6289  0.0015 
γ11+γ12 0.6 3000  -0.2015 0.0010 
θ 0.6 3000 -0.2941 -0.2015 0.0000 
β1 0.3 3000 0.1251 0.3489 0.0064 
β01 -0.12 3000 1.5748 1.5996 0.0059 
γ01 0.6 3000 -0.2941  0.0052 
γ01+γ22 0.36 3000  0.3308 0.0062 
β0 0.5 3000 -0.3250 -0.1907 0.0053 
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APPENDIX E 
 
To derive the likelihood function, it is necessary to have joint density. However, 
before considering the joint density of College and Marriage, let’s look at the 
conditional density first: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
01 02 0
11 12 1
Pr 1| 0
Pr 1| 0, 0 Pr( 0)
  Pr 1| 1, 0 Pr( 1)
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For the type 0, λ0 is uncorrelated with ξ0. Therefore, the first part of (A-1) is: 
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The second part of (A-1) is more complicated, because λ1 is correlated with ξ1 in this 
case: 
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Based on the conditional density, I can calculate the joint density. For the case 
Marriage =1 and College =0, the joint density is  
Case I: Marriage =1 and College =0 
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By using similar method, the joint density for the rest of three cases can be written 
as:  
Case II: Marriage =0 and College =0 
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Case III : Marriage =0 and College =1 
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Case IV : Marriage =1 and College =1 
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After deriving all of joint densities, the likelihood function is: 
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